

Household Demand for Employer-Based Health Insurance

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Abstract: We use the 1996 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey to estimate a model of household demand for employer-based health insurance, explicitly investigating differences in behavior between households with two potential sources of coverage and those with one source. Own and cross-price elasticities are estimated for three types of health plans, including exclusive provider organizations, any provider organizations, and mixed provider organizations. We find that the premium, family size, income, and wealth significantly affect demand. Our elasticity estimates reveal an overall, small behavioral response to changes in price with respect to health plan switching and take-up. Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings with respect to employer benefit design.

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I. Introduction

A key issue in health policy and health economics has been the question of the uninsured. Over 43 million Americans are without health insurance coverage, and that number has been growing over time (Rhoades et al, 2002, Hoffman and Schlobohm, 2000). There have been many proposals aimed at reducing the number of Americans without health insurance. A prominent feature of many of these proposals is to offer subsidies in the form of tax credits or vouchers for the purchase of health insurance. How effective these policies may be depends critically on the price sensitivity of demand for health insurance (Chernew et al, 1997, Blumberg et al, 2002). In addition, employers' policies towards health insurance offerings for their employees, particularly the question of how much of premium costs employees should pay, are also critically dependent on price sensitivity.

In this paper, we take advantage of a new data resource, the 1996 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), recently released by the U.S. Agency for Health Care Research and Quality (AHRQ). This is a nationally representative comprehensive survey of individuals and employers, and represents the most recent nationally representative data on insurance offerings and individuals' choices. Additionally, we explicitly consider the choices of two-earner households. Due to dramatic increases in female labor force participation, the majority of married households have two earners.² As the proportion of households with two earners rises, so does the proportion of households with two potential sources of employer-based health insurance (EBHI) coverage. For

² In 1998 the Census Bureau reported that in approximately 60% of non-elderly families, both spouses were employed (Casper and Bryson, 1998).

many families, and particularly for those with two potential coverage sources, decisions about whether to take up coverage and which plan or plans to choose are likely to be made jointly by both workers in the household, rather than by an individual worker.³

Last, few studies have been able to address the substitutability in demand of different kinds of health insurance plans (e.g., conventional health insurance like Blue Cross vs. HMOs). This information is important for benefit design by either government or private employers. It is also critical for market definition and has been notably lacking in some recent antitrust cases.⁴ By virtue of having employees' full range of choices and their characteristics in the data, we can recover this information.

Thus, we use the 1996 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) to estimate a model of household demand for employer-based health insurance. This allows us to identify the set of health plan and household attributes that influence decision-making, explicitly investigating differences in behavior between households with two potential sources of coverage and those with one source. We also estimate a set of own and cross-price elasticities of demand for three types of health plans including exclusive provider organizations (e.g., HMOs), mixed provider organizations (e.g., PPOs), and any provider organizations (e.g., conventional fee-for-service plans).

³ In related work, Abraham and Royalty (2002) find significant differences in the number and types of employer-based plans available to two-earner families as compared to other households, suggesting the importance of taking account of the full range of choices available when trying to understand how families make decisions about their health insurance.

⁴ See for example *Blue Cross and Blue Shield United of Wisconsin and Compare Health Services Insurance Corporation vs. Marshfield Clinic and Security Health Plan of Wisconsin, Inc.* U.S. Court of Appeals, 7th Circuit, Nos. 95-1965, 95-2140. <http://usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f0400/0421.htm>

In what follows, we first briefly survey the literature on health insurance demand (Section II). We then describe our econometric approach in Section III. The data and variable descriptions are contained in Section IV. Section V reports descriptive statistics and the econometric results. Finally, Section VI contains discussion and concluding remarks.

II. Previous Literature

The health insurance demand literature is large.⁵ Many of the early studies, including Juba et al (1980), McGuire (1981), Holmer (1984), Hershey et al (1984), Welch (1986), Marquis and Phelps (1987), Long et al (1988), Short and Taylor (1989), Taylor and Wilensky (1983), Farley and Wilensky (1984), Grazier (1986), Barringer and Mitchell (1994) and Deb et al (1996), examine the decisions of workers among offered plans, and find that factors including the price of coverage, cost-sharing provisions, income, health status, and demographic characteristics affect health plan choice.⁶

Focusing on decision-making within a managed care environment, Feldman et al (1989) used data on 3,000 employees from 17 firms in Minneapolis to estimate a nested logit model of health plan choice. They found price elasticities in the range of -.53 to -.15 for a firm with a 50 percent market share. Other studies examining health plan choice and switching behavior by university employees include Royalty and Solomon

⁵ Scanlon (1997) and Morrisey (1992) provide excellent reviews.

⁶ Feldstein (1973), Phelps (1976) and Goldstein and Pauly (1976) are the three earliest studies of health insurance demand, but data limitations suggest caution with respect to interpretation of their empirical results. Two other studies [Ellis (1989) and Marquis and Holmer (1996)] have also examined demand, but

(1999), Cutler and Reber (1998), and Buchmueller and Feldstein (1997). All three studies found that employees, on average, were price-elastic with respect to their demand for coverage.^{7,8}

To date, few studies have considered the influence of having two potential sources of coverage on employee and household decision-making. Blumberg et al (2002) use the 1996 MEPS to analyze a worker's decision to take up any coverage. They found that a worker was significantly less likely to take up coverage through her place of employment if her spouse was also offered insurance at work. Additionally, they found a small price elasticity between -.09 to -.01. Using earlier data from the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey, Monheit et al (1999) investigated a household's decision to take up two policies that together provided "double coverage," in which at least one household member was covered under both policies. They found that the probability of a household having double coverage was positively related to at least one policy having a zero contribution requirement.

used prospect theory rather than the more conventional expected utility theory to model the decision-making process.

⁷ Royalty and Solomon (1999) estimate own-price elasticities between -.96 to -1.753. Cutler and Reber (1998) find that a one percent increase in premium led to a two percent decrease in plan enrollment. Buchmueller and Feldstein (1996) find that 26% of health plan enrollees will switch to a cheaper plan when the monthly premium for their own plan rises by \$10.

⁸ One critique of these aforementioned studies is with respect to the generalizability of their results, given that they use data from a single organization or geographic market.

Dranove et al (2000) argued that, given a greater proportion of households with two-sources of coverage, employers would provide less generous coverage or require higher contributions in order to encourage employees to take up coverage with their spouse's employer. They developed a theoretical model relating firm size, employee contribution, and the tax subsidy associated with EBHI, and tested a set of predictions using data from the 1993 Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Employer Health Insurance Survey. Their results suggest that employee contributions are higher when more employees have working spouses and firms that have higher costs of insurance tend to have disproportionately higher contributions.⁹

This study extends the literature on four margins. First, we estimate a model using a recent, national sample of households and their employers, providing variation in premiums that is independent of plan characteristics. Second, by using the household as the unit of analysis, we are able to identify a more complete picture of the choices faced by household members and to control for household level factors that influence demand. Third, we explicitly investigate potential differences in behavior between households with two potential sources of coverage and those with one. Finally, after estimating own and cross-price elasticities, we evaluate the potential impact of changes in employer contributions or government subsidies on health plan switching, including the take-up of health insurance coverage.

III. Econometric Model

⁹ Gruber and McKnight (2002) estimate a model to examine the rise in employee contributions between 1982-1996. They find some empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that as an employee's outside options increase, including having coverage through a spouse, required contributions also rise.

We employ the random utility model of consumer choice (McFadden, 1974). We presume that households maximize expected utility and that employment status is exogenous.¹⁰ Under well-known conditions, this allows us to recover households' preference parameters by estimating the determinants of choice. We assume that the errors in the model are additive and distributed i.i.d. Weibull, thus leading to a multinomial logit specification. In what follows, we estimate the standard multinomial logit model of consumer choice.¹¹ Since the logit model can suffer from problems due to the imposed assumption of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), we also estimate a nested logit specification and test for the violation of the IIA (Hausman, 1978).

In the standard model of health insurance demand the key determinants of household choice of health insurance plan (including no employer sponsored coverage) are money and health (Cutler and Zeckhauser, 2000). Money consists of household income net of health care expenses. These expenses may include an employee

¹⁰ In this model we do not explicitly consider the intra-household decision-making process, which would allow one to more clearly understand the aggregation of preferences across household members regarding their coverage decisions.

¹¹ In multinomial logit models, recovering parameter estimates for attributes that do not vary across alternatives (e.g., household characteristics) is achieved by interacting those factors with a set of indicator variables corresponding to options in the choice set. However, because households' choice sets vary in this analysis, this would lead to too many parameters to estimate. We therefore employ an alternative approach. Specifically, each household characteristic is interacted with three plan characteristics corresponding to provider type, coverage type, and an indicator variable for the outside good (e.g., not taking up EBHI). This accomplishes the same goal without suffering from the "curse of dimensionality."

contribution toward the total premium, as well as out-of-pocket spending, which depends on the price of medical care and cost-sharing provisions of the chosen plan. Health state depends on the medical care consumption of household members, demographic characteristics, and a random shock parameter that captures some loss of health by one or more household members during the coverage period that can be restored at least partially with medical care.

When considering its coverage decision, the household must first identify the set of available plan choices. We define a household's choice set to consist of all combinations of health plans offered to employed members, as well as the choice of not taking up any employer-based coverage ("outside good"). The outside good encompasses several possibilities, including public insurance, non-group coverage, and choosing to go without insurance. For households with one source of employer provided health insurance, the choice set consists of the set of k plans offered by the employer and the outside good. The choice set is more complex for households with two-sources of health insurance. It consists of $k^1 * k^2$ possible combinations of coverage, where the superscript denotes an employer source, as well as the outside good (not taking up employer-provided coverage).

IV. Data

A. Data Description

We use two components of the 1996 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) to estimate the model (<http://www.meeps.ahrq.gov>, 2002). The first is the Household Component (HC), which is a random sample of the civilian non-institutionalized

population of the United States, containing individual level data on demographic characteristics, employment status, health status, healthcare coverage, and medical care utilization for 22,601 individuals in approximately 11,000 households. Our definition of a household is based on the constructed Health Insurance Eligibility Unit (HIEU) identifier contained in the data file. Specifically, an HIEU is a sub-family relationship unit constructed to include adults plus those family members who would typically be eligible for coverage under private family plans. These family members include spouses, unmarried natural or adopted children who are age 18 or under, and children under age 24 who are full-time students.

Household survey respondents who indicated that they were employed were asked for contact information regarding their place of employment, as well as permission to contact their employer. Employers of these household respondents were then surveyed and the results were compiled into the MEPS Insurance Component (IC) database. For the MEPS-IC, information was collected on up to four health plans for employees of private establishments and all plans offered by public employers. Information was collected on the total premium, employee contribution, plan type (exclusive provider organization, mixed provider organization, any choice of provider organization), coinsurance, deductibles, and covered benefits for plans that were both chosen and not chosen by the employee. Employers were also asked to verify employee eligibility and to confirm the plan and coverage type held by the employee.

While the data have substantial advantages over other sources, they suffer from one key limitation. The sample of workers with complete information contained on the IC is not nationally representative due to a high rate of non-response on the combined

surveys.¹² Some workers refused to grant permission for the surveyors to contact their employer, while others provided incomplete or inaccurate contact information.

Furthermore, some employers chose not to respond to certain items on the IC, which are necessary for estimating models of health plan choice (e.g., confirming which plan was held).

Our study population includes households in which one or more members are between the ages of 19 and 64, employed, and eligible to purchase employer-based healthcare coverage. We classify households into two groups. The first consists of households with one potential source of employer group coverage (“one-source” households). These include single member households, married households in which exactly one spouse is employed and eligible for coverage, and married households in which there are two earners, but only one is eligible to purchase insurance. The second group includes households with two workers who are both eligible to purchase coverage (“two-source” households).

After merging the data files and checking for missing information, the final sample consists of 1,481 one-source households and 232 two-source households. A set of descriptive statistics was tabulated to examine potential differences between those households included in the final sample and those that were excluded due to incomplete information. For the one-source households, those included in the final sample have higher income, more serious medical conditions, and are more likely to have a federal

¹² Due to this non-response, the MEPS-IC is considered a confidential database and is only available for use at the CCFS Data Center of AHRQ in Washington, DC.

government worker in the household. No statistically significant differences were identified for the two-source households.

B. Choice Sets

Table 1 provides the distribution of the number of plans available to households in the final sample. Of the 1,481 households with one source of coverage, approximately 55% have more than one plan from which to choose, and by definition all two-source households have plan choice. In the decision-making process, households must also select the type of coverage (e.g., single or family). This is an important consideration since it not only affects who is covered but typically the required contribution too. Therefore, we define each “option” in a one source household’s choice set to consist of the combination of a particular plan and coverage type (e.g., Plan A-single coverage, Plan A-family coverage) plus the outside good. For two-source households, the choice set is more complex since it consists of all possible combinations of plan-coverage type options belonging to each of the workers in the household plus the outside good. These households may choose to take up coverage from neither, one, or both employer sources, and/or may choose to take up plans with different combinations of coverage types such as two single policies, one single and one family policy, or two family policies.¹³

C. Explanatory Variables

¹³ For this analysis, we assume that employment and healthcare coverage options are exogenous. In particular, if workers sort into jobs or there is sorting within households based on particular preferences regarding the trade-off between wage and non-wage benefits, this may bias the parameter estimates.

Several household attributes may affect demand. The relevant price for analyzing household behavior is the annual, employee contribution toward the total premium.¹⁴ For options that include two plans, we use the sum of the employee contributions for our measure of price. We also include a set of interaction terms of the contribution with our household attributes, which are described below. Health care plans vary in terms of their cost-sharing provisions, such as coinsurance and deductibles. For one-source households, we include a measure of the coinsurance rate and deductible for outpatient care. For options that include two plans, average deductible and coinsurance measures for the plans are specified.

In recent years, growing dissatisfaction with limited provider access in managed care plans has led to the development of new types of coverage that allow for greater freedom of choice of providers. In the MEPS-IC, plans are classified into one of three categories corresponding to provider organizational structure. These categories include exclusive provider organizations (EPOs), any provider organizations (ANY), and organizations that are a mixture of exclusive and any providers (MIX). These categories are analogous to Health Maintenance Organizations, conventional fee-for-service plans, and Preferred Provider Organizations or Point-of-Service plans, respectively. As a way to capture households' preferences for these products, we include a variable in the model

¹⁴ The MEPS IC asks employers to report the contribution for an "average full-time employee," which may or may not accurately reflect what the particular household member would pay. However, through discussions with MEPS surveyors, we have been informed that among establishments offering coverage to all workers, only a small percentage vary contribution requirements between full-time and part-time workers who are offered insurance.

corresponding to an option having freedom of choice (FOC) of provider. This variable combines the last two organizational structures above.

To control for which household members are covered by a plan option, we specify an indicator variable for family coverage in the one-source household specification. Again, since two-source households may choose two plans, we use information on the number of household members and coverage type associated with each plan to construct a variable for whether an option provides coverage for the entire household or only partial household coverage.¹⁵ Finally, we include an indicator variable to identify the outside good option in each household's choice set.

Several household characteristics are included. First, household size should influence preferences regarding the selection of single or family coverage. Measured as a binary variable, for one-source households it equals one if the household has a single member, zero otherwise; for two-source households, it equals one if the household has two members, zero otherwise.¹⁶ Since our one-source households are more heterogeneous in terms of their demographic characteristics, we include a measure for whether household members are married. And for both household types, we include the number of children under the age of 18.

Given the interrelated nature of medical care consumption and health insurance demand, we include a measure of health status, defined as the number of serious medical

¹⁵ Very few of our two-source households chose to take up options with partial coverage or no coverage (outside good). As a result, these two categories were combined.

¹⁶ Several household size measures were considered, including categorical and continuous versions. The decision to use binary measures was based on the results of likelihood ratio tests.

conditions per capita in the household.¹⁷ Poorer health may be positively associated with taking up coverage, and potentially more comprehensive coverage in order to protect against financial losses associated with anticipated medical expenses.

Income and wealth are also hypothesized to influence demand. Purchasing insurance is consistent with having diminishing marginal utility of income and risk aversion. Following Holmer (1984), we include the natural log of household wage income. Without any direct measures of household wealth, we use tax filing status to proxy for it. Our rationale is that households filing a 1040 form are more likely to have investment income that requires them to do so (e.g., capital gains distributions). We include an indicator variable to control for whether at least one individual in the household is employed by the federal government. For these individuals, information on their health plan options and contribution were coded directly by survey administrators, rather than through the standard interview procedure used in data collection. Finally, we interact each household characteristic with three indicator variables corresponding to plan type, coverage type, and the outside good.

V. Results

A. Descriptive Analysis

Tables 2 and 3 provide summary statistics for the household and plan characteristics. Two-source households are more likely to be married (1 vs. .48) and have higher income (\$62,684 vs. \$38,186). One-source households face slightly higher premium contributions on average for single coverage than do two-source households

¹⁷ Possible medical conditions include stroke, cancer, heart disease, gall bladder disease, high blood pressure, arteriosclerosis, rheumatism, emphysema, arthritis, and diabetes.

(\$380 vs. \$334), while there are smaller differences in family coverage contributions. In our sample, approximately 41% of one-source households have access to a free (zero premium contribution) single coverage plan and 21% have access to free family coverage. An even greater percentage of two-source households have access, with 56% and 29% having free single and family coverage options, respectively.

For both household types, approximately 53% of available plans are EPOs, 38% are MIX provider types, and eight percent of plans allow access to any provider.

However, if we more closely examine each household's set of options, it is clear that two-source households have a wider range of choices of plan types. For example, 44% of our two-source households have both a managed care and a non-managed care plan from which to choose, in contrast to only 18% of one-source households.

Figures 1 and 2 show the coverage and plan types held by the one and two-source households, respectively. For those households with one source of coverage, 91% take up the offered coverage, with almost half choosing single coverage and the remaining selecting family coverage. Of those holding coverage, 38% chose EPOs, 47% selected plans with a mixture of exclusive and any providers, and the remaining selected any provider plans. For two-source households, approximately 97% take up EBHI and, of those, 56% select an option with two plans. For the subset holding two plans, nearly 68% take up a combination of coverage that provides "double-coverage" for at least one member of the family.

B. Model Estimates

Tables 4 and 5 contain the multinomial logit model estimates.¹⁸ Among one-source households, we find that those with higher income and more serious medical conditions are more likely to take up employer-based coverage (less likely to choose the outside good), while households with a federal government worker are less likely to do so. Additionally, households that are married and those having more children are more likely to choose family coverage, relative to single coverage. Regarding the type of plan that households choose, both one and two-source households are less likely to enroll in plans with a freedom of choice of provider, which is surprising, having controlled for price differences.

We find strong support for the effect of price on health plan choice: households are less likely to choose plan options that have higher out-of-pocket contributions. Price-sensitivity also varies with several household attributes. Married households, those with children, and households that have a federal government worker exhibit a larger response to price changes, while higher income households appear to be less sensitive to price.

¹⁸ One methodological concern about the multinomial logit is the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives assumption. This assumption implies that unobserved variations in the characteristics of alternative choices are independently distributed, such that the relative probability of choosing any option is independent of the other choices available to the household. We also estimated nested logit models for both groups of households. For one source households the nesting structure corresponded to choosing to take-up coverage or not, and for two source households the nesting structure corresponded to selecting a plan with freedom of choice of provider. The results from both models are qualitatively similar to our multinomial logit results. The nested logit results are reported in the Appendix.

For our two-source households, we find that wealthier households, as measured by our 1040 proxy, tend to be less price-sensitive.

C. Elasticity Estimates

Table 6 presents three sets of elasticities to examine the magnitude of behavioral responses exhibited by households to changes in the price of coverage. Own-price elasticities are calculated to measure the extent of health plan switching within a particular plan type (e.g., switching from one EPO plan to another EPO), while cross-price elasticities measure the willingness to substitute from one type to another (e.g., switching from an EPO to a mixed provider plan). It is worth noting that the well-known result that elasticities in multinomial logit models depend only upon choice probabilities and the price coefficient is true here only at the individual level: “market” own and cross price elasticities depend also upon the distribution of household characteristics, which we observe at the individual level. The third is an overall demand elasticity, which provides a measure of choosing the outside good, in other words not taking up any employer-based coverage, when contributions increase for all available plans.

With health plan options varying by coverage type, plan type, and even the number of plans, it is necessary to modify conventional interpretation methods. Rather than estimating the magnitude of the effect in terms of changes in probability, our calculation of elasticities is made in terms of changes in expected covered lives for EPOs, mixed provider plans (MIX), any provider plans (ANY), and the outside good. For each option in a household’s choice set, we calculated covered lives by allocating the number of household members to each of the four categories above based on information about plan type(s) and coverage type(s). For example, if a household has three members and

the option is an any provider plan with single coverage, then there are zero EPO covered lives, zero MIX covered lives, one ANY covered life, and two outside good covered lives.¹⁹ Expected covered lives were then calculated for each option by multiplying the predicted probability of an option by the covered lives for each category, and then summing over all of the options in the household's choice set.

Marginal effects were calculated discretely, given the presence of household interactions with contribution and the complex nature of households' options.²⁰ Marginal effects were computed for four different contribution increases: an increase in the contribution of EPO plans; an increase in the contribution of ANY plans; an increase in the contribution of MIX plans; and an increase in the contribution of all plans.

In Table 6, the first set of estimates corresponds to the average behavioral response for all households, while the second set represents the average behavioral response exhibited by the subset of households having the particular plan types in their choice sets. Own-price elasticity estimates range from -.13 to -.15 for any provider plans, -.13 to -.14 for EPOs, and -.19 to -.27 for mixed provider plans, while cross-price elasticity estimates

¹⁹ For two-source household options including two plans, this is more complicated. For example, two source households with options including two family coverage plans of different types had their members split equally. So, for a household with three members, if the option contains an ANY plan with family coverage and an EPO plan with family coverage, then there are 1.5 ANY covered lives, 1.5 EPO covered lives, 0 MIX covered lives, and zero outside good covered lives.

²⁰ To calculate the marginal effect of a change in contribution on expected covered lives, we increased the contribution by \$1, adjusting the values of all interaction terms in the model, re-computed the option probabilities for every household, calculated new values for our expected covered lives, and took the difference with the baseline expected covered lives to obtain the marginal effect.

range from .02 to .32. As expected, EPOs and mixed provider plans are perceived as closer substitutes relative to any provider plans. Estimates of the average elasticity of expected outside good covered lives with respect to the contribution suggests that raising all plan contributions leads to a small decrease in the take-up rate by households. For one-source households, we estimate this overall demand elasticity to be .21, which is somewhat larger than what was found by Blumberg et al (2002).

Overall, the results suggest that there would be a small behavioral response in terms of switching within and across plan types associated with changing plan contributions. The elasticities reported here are smaller in magnitude than estimates found in other recent studies of health plan choice such as Royalty and Solomon (1999), Cutler and Reber (1998) and Buchmueller and Feldstein (1997). One possible reason is greater plan heterogeneity available to the households in our sample, as compared to the aforementioned studies in which plan choices are more similar (e.g., all managed care plans), and in some cases, have standardized benefit structures. Greater product differentiation may provide a partial explanation for smaller price elasticities. Additionally, there may be unobserved plan characteristics within households' choice sets that are correlated with the contribution, subsequently resulting in attenuation bias on our price-sensitivity estimates (Berry et al, 1995). One example of omitted variables could be perceived health plan quality, such as reputation or the size of the provider panel.

VI. Discussion and Concluding Remarks

A. Discussion

While the own and cross-price elasticity estimates provide insights regarding how changes in contribution affect switching between plan types, another concern of employers pertains to the costs they bear with respect to subsidizing family coverage, particularly when a worker has access to coverage through a spouse. Dranove et al (2000) examine the issue of “employer competition” to be the employer not chosen to sponsor coverage for a worker when he or she has another potential source. Results from their analysis provide indirect evidence to support this form of “employer competition.” While changing the benefits and increasing contribution requirements are two ways to engage in this form of “competition”, another way is to establish an “opt-out” provision, or cash payment to a worker who chooses not to take up any coverage.²¹

From an employer’s perspective, the cost-effectiveness of offering an opt-out provision depends on the extent to which employees switch from taking up coverage to not taking up coverage, the amount of the payment, and the employer-portion of health insurance costs. To be cost-effective, the savings generated from not having to pay the employer portion of health insurance costs for those who opt out must be greater than the new costs associated with the payments made to workers who choose not to take up coverage.

We estimate the cost-effectiveness of four different opt-out payments (\$400, \$600, \$800, and \$1000) for the employers of the households in our sample using information on the employer-portion of health insurance costs and the change in probability of an employee taking up coverage with his or her own employer. A more

²¹ In 1999, approximately 14% of all workers were employed in firms offering such a provision (Gabel et al, 2000).

detailed explanation of the methodology can be found in the Appendix. For our two-source households, the average baseline probability of a worker in the household selecting an option that includes a plan sponsored by his or her own employer is .8. Making a \$1000 opt-out payment available to these workers leads to a reduction in the average probability of taking up coverage of .19, or a 24% decrease in the take-up rate. As expected, the effect is somewhat smaller for our households with only one source of coverage. For this group, the probability of selecting an option that includes an employer-sponsored plan is .89. Again, making the opt-out provision available leads to a 15 point decrease in the probability of taking up coverage, or an approximate 17% decline in the take-up rate.

With information on the employer-portion of the total premium for each plan, we also estimated how the average cost per employee for providing health care coverage changes as a result of enacting this compensation policy. Table 7 reports the average cost per employee under the four opt-out payment levels. We find that for employers of both household types, establishing this provision can reduce employers' costs, though we find it to be more cost-effective for the employers of two-source households. For example, if a \$1000 opt-out payment is offered, we find that for employers of the one-source households, their average cost per employee decreases \$31 from \$2,337 to \$2,306, whereas, for employers of the two-source households the average cost per employee falls between \$83 and \$133. Relating these results back to the model proposed in Dranove et al (2000), our findings provide direct evidence that opt-out provisions influence behavior of workers with respect to taking up coverage and may serve to provide another method

by which employers compete to not be chosen when workers have an alternative source of coverage.

B. Concluding Remarks

In this study, we estimate a model of household demand for employer-based health insurance using the 1996 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey. We find that factors such as household income, wealth, family size, and having a household member employed by the federal government all significantly affect health insurance demand. Most notably, our empirical results suggest that households are less likely to choose a plan option requiring a higher employee contribution, *ceteris paribus*.

Demand elasticities reveal an overall, small behavioral response to changes in the price of coverage as it relates to health plan switching and the decision to take up any employer-based coverage. While we find no significant differences between households with one source of coverage and those with two potential sources of coverage, we do find that households with a second source of coverage are more likely to switch from taking-up to not taking-up coverage from a particular employer source when offered alternative compensation, such as an opt-out provision.

Our results also have important policy implications. As policymakers consider proposals to make health insurance more affordable to the uninsured through the use of subsidies or tax credits, the effectiveness of these programs depends critically on whether households will choose to take up coverage given these reductions in the price. What our results suggest is that in order for such programs to have an impact on reducing the number of uninsured, the tax credits or vouchers would have to be quite large.

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Table 1: Distribution of Plans Available

Total number of plans for household	One-source households (N=1481)		Two-source Households (N=232)	
	Counts of Households	Percentage	Counts of Households	Percentage
1	667	45.04	0	0
2	239	16.1	56	28.45
3	131	8.85	27	11.64
4	141	9.52	28	12.07
5	21	1.42	24	10.34
6	15	1.01	11	4.74
7	9	.61	11	4.74
8	10	.68	5	2.16
9	13	.88	5	2.16
10+	235	15.89	75	32.3

Table 2: Household Attributes

Variable	One-source households (N=1481)		Two-source Households (N=232)	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Family size=1	.39*	.49
Family size=242	.49
Married	.48	.5	1	0
Household wage income (\$)	38,186*	27,292	62,684	32,201
File1040	.47*	.5	.66	.48
Medical conditions per capita	.43*	.75	.38	.52
Federal government worker in the household	.09*	.28	.09	.28
Number of kids 0-18	.77	1.07	1.00	1.14

* Indicates that the average value for the households in the final estimation sample is significantly different ($p < .05$) from the average value for the eligible households that did not meet the “completeness of information” criteria. There are 2,415 one-source and 785 two-source households that did not meet the “completeness of information” criteria. The completeness criteria includes having a link to the employer; knowing the plan type; knowing the contributions for each option.

Table 3: Plan Characteristics

Variable	One-source households		Two-source Households	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Single contribution (\$100s)	3.80	4.74	3.34	4.35
Family contribution (\$100s)	14.17	12.20	14.35	11.69
Individual deductible (\$)	131.6	340.5	148.7	442
Outpatient coinsurance (%)	8.9	5.3	9.24	6.13
Exclusive provider organization (EPO)	.532	.5	.54	.5
Mixed provider organization (MIX)	.384	.49	.38	.49
Any provider plan (ANY)	.083	.28	.082	.27

Table 4: Multinomial logit – One-source households

Variable Name	Parameter Estimate	Standard Error
Contribution	-.084***	.0009
Family size 1*Contribution	-.19***	.02
Married*Contribution	-.066***	.012
Ln Income*Contribution	.016*	.008
File 1040*Contribution	.017	.01
Medical conditions*Contribution	-.012	.008
Government*Contribution	-.053**	.022
Number of kids*Contribution	-.027***	.005
Family size 1*FOC	.252	.302
Family size 1*Family coverage
Family size 1*Outside good	-.595	.456
Married*FOC	.453*	.266
Married*Family coverage	3.20***	.212
Married*Outside good	1.64***	.382
Ln Income*FOC	.108	.144
Ln Income*Family coverage	.122	.169
Ln Income*Outside good	-.64***	.20
File 1040*FOC	.084	.19
File 1040*Family coverage	.158	.213
File 1040*Outside good	-.113	.292
Medical conditions*FOC	.169	.124
Medical conditions*Family coverage	-.058	.127
Medical conditions*Outside good	-.381*	.215
Government*FOC	.014	.23
Government*Family coverage	.411	.324
Government*Outside good	2.22***	.431
Number of kids*FOC	-.187*	.108
Number of kids*Family coverage	1.266***	.12
Number of kids*Outside good	.456**	.183
FOC	-.249**	.10
Family coverage	.39***	.106
Outside good	-1.28***	.178
Deductible	.0000	.0001
Coinsurance rate	.016**	.009
Number of households	1481	
LR (33)	1429.1	
Pseudo R ²	.265	

*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level

Table 5: Multinomial logit – Two-source Households

Variable Name	Parameter Estimate	Standard Error
Contribution	-.09***	.03
Family size 2*Contribution	-.008	.03
Ln Income*Contribution	-.024	.02
File 1040*Contribution	.064***	.024
Medical conditions*Contribution	-.006	.018
Government*Contribution	-.04	.04
Number of kids*Contribution	-.002	.014
Family size 2*All covered	.377	1.21
Family size 2*FOC Provider	-1.02*	.62
Ln Income*All covered	1.27	.835
Ln Income*FOC Provider	-.165	.422
File 1040*All covered	-.026	.847
File 1040*FOC Provider	-.275	.429
Medical conditions*All covered	.468	1.022
Medical conditions*FOC Provider	.274	.365
Government*All covered	-1.05	1.28
Government*FOC Provider	-.622	.585
Number of kids*All covered	.261	.513
Number of kids*FOC Provider	-.478	.295
All covered	3.96***	.496
FOC Provider	-.905***	.202
Average deductible	-.0008**	.0004
Average coinsurance rate	.03	.023
Number of households	232	
LR (23)	265.3	
Pseudo R ²	.165	

*significant at the .10 level ** significant at the .05 level *** significant

Table 6: Average Elasticity Estimates (standard errors in parentheses)

Elasticity	One-source households		Two-source Households	
	All households (N=1,481)	Subset of one-source households with plan options	All households (N=232)	Subset of two-source households with plan options
EPO,EPO	-.14 (.003)	-.14 (.003)	-.13 (.036)	-.13 (.028)
MIX, MIX	-.19 (.005)	-.19 (.005)	-.27 (.04)	-.27 (.04)
ANY, ANY	-.15 (.004)	-.15 (.004)	-.13 (.002)	-.13 (.003)
EPO, MIX	.12 (.003)	.21 (.005)	.13 (.03)	.15 (.003)
MIX, EPO	.07 (.002)	.25 (.006)	.18 (.05)	.32 (.068)
EPO, ANY	.03 (.006)	.12 (.002)	.02 (.0003)	.05 (.0007)
ANY, EPO	.06 (.001)	.23 (.004)	.11 (.004)	.23 (.008)
MIX, ANY	.02 (.012)	.15 (.035)	.03 (.002)	.11 (.003)
ANY, MIX	.05 (.002)	.16 (.006)	.12 (.007)	.10 (.008)
Outside good, all plans	.21 (.004)

Table 7: Average Cost Per Employee with Opt-Out Provision
(standard deviation in parentheses)

	One-source households	Two-source Households	
	Employer	Employer 1	Employer 2
Baseline	\$2337 (1387)	\$2232 (1268)	\$2429 (1420)
\$400 Opt-Out Payment	\$2312 (1351)	\$2172 (1203)	\$2354 (1358)
\$600 Opt-Out Payment	\$2303 (1326)	\$2152 (1160)	\$2324 (1319)
\$800 Opt-Out Payment	\$2301 (1296)	\$2144 (1109)	\$2304 (1272)
\$1000 Opt-Out Payment	\$2306 (1259)	\$2149 (1052)	\$2296 (1221)

Figure 1: Held Plans of One-source households





Figure 2: Held Plans for Two-source Households



Appendix

One-source households - Nested Logit Estimates

Twig: Choice | Inside Good

	Parameter Estimate	Standard Error
Contribution	-.107***	.014
Family size 1 * Contribution	-.24***	.03
Married*Contribution	-.086***	.013
Number of kids*Contribution	-.034***	.006
LnIncome*Contribution	.019*	.009
File1040*Contribution	.028**	.013
Government*Contribution	-.039*	.021
Medical conditions*Contribution	-.009	.009
Family size 1*FOC	.370	.327
Married*Family coverage	3.39***	.234
Married*FOC	.388	.291
Number of kids*FOC	-.167	.118
Number of kids*Family coverage	1.384***	.140
LnIncome*FOC	.207	.158
LnIncome*Family coverage	.189	.196
File1040*FOC	.093	.205
File1040*Family coverage	.085	.240
Government*FOC	.026	.236
Government*Family coverage	.303	.351
Medical Conditions*FOC	.178	.13
Medical Conditions*Family coverage	-.04	.133
FOC	-.368***	.113
Family coverage	.468***	.118
Coinsurance	.014	.01
Deductible	.0000	.0001
Number of households	1358	
LR(25)	1137.09	
Pseudo R2	.26	

One-source households

Branch: Dependent variable - Take up Insurance

	Parameter estimate	Standard error
Family size 1	.43	.335
Married	-.052	.273
Number of kids	-.035	.115
LnIncome	.834***	.142
File 1040	.344	.221
Government	-.996***	.372
Medical Conditions Per Capita	.399**	.18
Inclusive Value	.353***	.076
Constant	2.108***	.15
Number of households	1481	
LR(8)	96.94	
Pseudo R2	.11	

Two-source Households – Nested Logit

Twig: Freedom of Choice

	FOC Provider		Non-FOC	
	Parameter Estimate	Standard error	Parameter Estimate	Standard error
Contribution	-.091***	.014	-.16***	.03
Family size 2 * Contribution	.058	.042	-.20***	.07
Number of kids*Contribution	.026	.022	-.045	.03
LnIncome*Contribution	-.038*	.022	.025	.046
File1040*Contribution	.11***	.034	-.09*	.048
Government*Contribution	.04	.037	-.49***	.138
Medical conditions per capita*Contribution	.016	.02		
All covered	4.13	.751	5.34	.987
All covered*Family size 2	-.286	1.64	2.501	2.34
All covered*Number of kids	-.142	.70	.919	.958
All covered*Ln Income	1.55	1.17	2.75	1.803
All covered*File 1040	-.573	1.14	1.65	1.64
All covered*Medical conditions per capita	.597	1.56	-.772	1.39
Deductible	-.0007*	.0004	-.005	.004
Coinsurance	.031	.029	.027	.066
LR(15)	151.97		118.64	
Pseudo R2	.17		.24	

Two-source Households
 Branch: Take up Coverage

	Parameter Estimate	Standard error
Family size 2	-2.51***	.738
Number of kids	-1.07***	.34
Ln Income	.206	.427
File 1040	-1.24***	.48
Government	-3.92***	.916
Medical conditions per capita	-.058	.360
Inclusive Value	-.62***	.123
Constant	-.835***	.275
Number of households	164	
LR(7)	42.38	
Pseudo R2	.19	

Elasticity Estimates using Nested Logit Results

Elasticity	All one-source households (N=1,481)	Subset of one-source households with plan options	All two-source households (N=232)	Subset of two-source households with plan options
EPO,EPO	-.15	-.15	-.16	-.16
MIX, MIX	-.18	-.18	-.27	-.27
ANY, ANY	-.15	-.15	-.13	-.13
EPO, MIX	.14	.25	.14	.15
MIX, EPO	.09	.29	.19	.35
EPO, ANY	.04	.15	-.04	-.04
ANY, EPO	.08	.29	.10	.22
MIX, ANY	.02	.19	.04	.13
ANY, MIX	.07	.20	.15	.12
Outside good, all plans	.09	

Opt-Out Payment Exercise Methodology

Employer Benefit Design:

(1) Switching

$$\Delta P = P^N - P^B$$

$$P^B = \sum_i^J P_{b,i} \text{ and } P^N = \sum_i^J P_{n,i}$$

J options including plan(s) sponsored by employer

P^B : Baseline probability of choosing an option with a plan sponsored by employer

P^N : New probability of choosing an option with a plan sponsored by employer given the opt out payment

$P_{b,i}$: Baseline probability of choosing option i in household's choice set

$P_{n,i}$: New probability of choosing option I in household's choice set given opt out payment

(2) Cost-Effectiveness of “opt out” provision: This is done by comparing the average cost per employee for health insurance before implementation of an “opt out” provision (AC^B), to the average cost per employee after the provision is established (AC^N).

AC^B : Baseline average cost per employee

EC_b : Baseline employer portion of total premium

EC_n : Baseline employer portion for plans, but opt out payment for “outside good”