Impact of Software Vulnerability Announcements on the Market Value of Software Vendors – an Empirical Investigation

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February 2005

1 The authors would like to thank Ashish Arora, Ramayya Krishnan, Sandra Slaughter, participants at the Security Working Group Meeting at Heinz School of Public Policy, and Workshop on Information Systems and Economics (WISE 2004) for helpful comments and suggestions.
ABSTRACT

Researchers in the area of information security have mainly been concerned with tools, techniques and policies that firms can use to protect themselves against security breaches. However, information security is as much about security software as it is about secure software. Software is not secure when it has defects or flaws which can be exploited by hackers to cause attacks such as unauthorized intrusion or denial of service attacks. Any public announcement about a software defect is termed as ‘vulnerability disclosure’.

Although research in software economics have studied firms’ incentive to improve overall quality, there have been no studies to show that software vendors have an incentive to invest in building more secure software. In this paper, we use the event study methodology to examine the role that financial markets play in determining software vendors’ incentives to build more secure software. We collect data from leading national newspapers and industry sources like CERT by searching for reports on published software vulnerabilities. We show that vulnerability disclosures lead to a negative and significant change in market value for a software vendor. On average, a vendor loses around 0.6% value in stock price when a vulnerability is reported. This is equivalent to a loss in market capitalization values of $0.86 billion per vulnerability announcement. To provide further insight, we use the information content of the disclosure announcement to classify vulnerabilities into various types. We find that the change in stock price is more negative if the vendor fails to provide a patch at the time of disclosure. Moreover, vulnerabilities which cause a confidentiality related breach cause a greater decline in the market value for a vendor than the vulnerabilities which cause non-confidentiality related breaches. Also, more severe flaws have a significantly greater impact than flaws with low or moderate severity. Finally, we find that the markets do not punish a software vendor more severely if a third party discovers a flaw in its product than if the vendor itself discovers the flaw. Our analysis provides many interesting implications for software vendors as well as policy makers.

Keyword: information security, software vulnerability, quality, event study, disclosure policy
1. Introduction

Many believe that software vendors typically follow the policy of ‘sell today and fix it tomorrow’; or ‘I’d rather have it wrong than have it late’ (Paulk et al 1994; Arora, Caulkins, Telang 2004) for launching software products in the market. This policy, dictated by the need to launch products quickly before competitors, seemed to work in the past because software errors which escape detection during pre-launch testing appear very infrequently in normal operations (once every ‘5000’ years, as per Adams, 1980). However, Adams’ ‘5000-year error’ theory might not hold in the internet age because hundreds (if not thousands) of people are looking for flaws in other vendors software products, drastically increasing the chances that a flaw will be exposed. Various people such as hackers, independent security firms and academic researchers are interested in finding flaws in other vendors’ software for different reasons. Not only are security software products such as firewalls at risk, but software like operating systems, enterprise software and database software also contain flaws which can be exploited to create security related attacks.

The Organization of Internet Safety (OIS) (www.oisafety.org) defines security vulnerability as$^2$: “security vulnerability is a flaw within a software system that can cause it to work contrary to its documented design and could be exploited to cause the system to violate its documented security policy”. Software vulnerabilities have widespread impact and can potentially cause billions of dollars in downtime and disruptions to firms (In this paper, the word ‘firms’ refers to companies which use software products; ‘vendors’ refers to companies which develop the software products). A study by NIST in 2002 estimates the cost of faulty software at $60 bn per year. Incidents like the Code Red virus (in 2001) and the Melissa virus (in 1999) occurred when hackers exploited flaws in software. The damage due to Code Red was estimated at $2.1 bn and due to Melissa at $1.1bn$^3$. The Gartner Group estimates that the system downtime caused by security vulnerabilities would triple from 5% of the total downtime in 2004 to 15% of the total downtime in 2008.$^4$

In 2003, Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) reported around 250,000 self

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$^2$ In this paper, we use the terms ‘software vulnerability’, ‘security vulnerability’, ‘bug’, ‘flaw’ interchangeably. Any other type of vulnerability such as a non-security related vulnerability explicit mentioned by name.

$^3$ Source: www.cisco.com/warp/public/cc/so/neso/sqso/roi1_wp.pdf

$^4$ http://www.tekrati.com/T2/Analyst_Research/ResearchAnnouncementsDetails.asp?Newsid=3608
reported incidences of system breaches, most of which exploit vulnerabilities in software code (Applewhite 2004). Microsoft’s $200m campaign for .NET was marred by the discovery of a security flaw in Visual C++ .NET barely a month after Microsoft Chairman Bill Gates directed employees to focus on building more secure software (dubbed the ‘Trustworthy Computing’ initiative). Moreover, vulnerability disclosure is finding its way into firms’ strategy toolkits as it evident from a WSJ report in Feb 2004 that software vendors are spending time and effort in discovering flaws in their rivals’ software products in order to influence the rivals’ stock prices. For example, security software vendor IDS released a vulnerability alert on rival Checkpoint’s firewall software on the day Checkpoint usually holds its annual US investor conference. Some examples of vulnerability announcements reported in popular press are:

- News.com(04/25/2000) “A computer security firm has discovered a serious vulnerability in Red Hat’s newest version of Linux that could let attackers destroy or deface a Web site - or possibly even take over the machine itself........”
- WSJ(02/11/2004) “Microsoft Corp. warned customers about serious security problems with its Windows software that let hackers quietly break into their computers to steal files, delete data or eavesdrop on sensitive information........”

Inspite of all these concerns about software vulnerabilities, not much has been mentioned in literature about the incentive of software vendors to invest in defect-free software. Literature on software risks fails to include any measure for security related risks (Wallace, Keil and Rai, 2004; Barki, Rivard and Talbot, 1993). The closest literature to the topic of security vulnerabilities is that on software quality (Basili and Musa, 1991; Harter, Krishnan and Slaughter, 2000). However, in traditional literature, quality is measured in terms of reliability and integrity of the source code – which essentially tests software against specified streams of input from users. However, in today’s internet age, software designers must not only think of users, but also malicious adversaries (Devanbu and Stubblebine, 2000). Some quality models such as ISO9126 fail to include computer security (Pfleegar 1997). Therefore software which has been certified as high quality, based on existing definitions of software quality, can have many security flaws. Researchers in computer science are working on better integration of the two disciplines of

So far, there has only been anecdotal evidence that software vulnerabilities are causing vendors to lose market value. For example, the Wall Street Journal (11/09/2004) reported that Microsoft’s Internet Explorer (IE) is losing market share in the web browser market to competitors like Mozilla’s Firefox, due to numerous flaws discovered in IE. For example, nearly 8 million people have downloaded the Firefox browser between September-November 2004. While the damage that firms suffer as a result of security breaches can be measured in terms of downtime and maintenance activity, the cost implication of vulnerability disclosures on the software vendors is neither clear nor well studied. This is the major goal of this paper. Using an event study methodology, we estimate how the stock price of the software vendors is affected when vulnerability information in their products is published in popular press.

Prior literature on product defects (Jarrell and Peltzman 1985) predicts that product recall announcements in drug and auto industries are associated with loss in market value of a firm. Davidson and Worrell (1992) confirm the negative impact of product defects on stock prices in non-auto industries and also analyze the impact of different types of recall (e.g. total product recall versus a recall for repair; government ordered recall versus voluntary recall). However the results of these prior studies on product defects cannot be directly applied to the software industry because of the following characteristics of software products: One, software products generally come with a click-wrap agreement (or EULA – End User License Agreement) which limits the vendors’ liability. Two, the general philosophy held by software vendors, software customers and the US courts is that software is a uniquely complex product that will probably have some defects (Cusumano 2004). Therefore it is not clear whether markets will react adversely to the news of a software vulnerability; because over the long run, markets will anticipate the effect of a vulnerability announcements on cash flows of software vendors, so the impact of a specific announcement might not be significant. Three, software vulnerability announcements are generally accompanied with a remedial patch which potentially protects customers from malicious exploits. Hence, the market may not behave adversely towards a vendor if it releases a patch along-with the vulnerability announcement. Finally, vulnerability
announcements are directly related to the installed base of a software product. Popular software like those from Microsoft are constantly subject to malicious and non-malicious attacks and as such have a greater proportion of flaws reported in them as compared to software by Apple, where the user base is comparatively smaller. Therefore, the presence of vulnerabilities may not always signal a lower quality product; it may in-fact signal superiority over competition. E.g. John Thomson, CEO of Symantec, predicts that the flaws in Linux will likely increase as the installed base increases. In view of these arguments, it would be interesting to understand whether and how the market responds to vulnerability disclosures in software products.

Motivated by these observations, in this research we try to quantify the losses that software vendors bear when a vulnerability is disclosed in their product. The main questions that we seek to answer are:

1. What is the impact of vulnerability disclosures on the market value of a software vendor?
2. How do the characteristics of the vulnerability impact this change in market value?

Our research has important policy implications in terms of understanding vendors’ incentive to improve pre- and post-launch quality of their software products. While there is lot of hype surrounding the poor quality dished out by software vendors, their incentives to provide more secure software is still unclear. If we indeed find that the market is willing to punish vulnerability announcements because it perceives these announcements as a signal of poor quality software which either increase vendor costs to fix them or erode their market share in the long run, then our research provides a direct evidence of incentives to provide more secure software. Vulnerabilities are disclosed by vendors or by third party/competitors with or without a patch. Since we measure if there are significant differences in market reaction to such disclosures, our paper provides policy guidelines to vendors about whether and how they may disclose the information themselves. Moreover, this also provides evidence on what is the value of patches when vulnerabilities are disclosed. Finally, we also examine how vulnerability characteristics, effect of 9/11 etc affect the market reaction.

Using an event-study approach, we collect data on about 146 vulnerability disclosure announcements over the period of over 5 years for 18 publicly traded vendors. Our results
confirm that vulnerability disclosure adversely and significantly affects the stock performance of a software vendor. We show that, on average, a software vendor loses around 0.63% of market value on the day of the vulnerability announcement. This translates to a dollar amount of $0.86 bn loss in market value. We also find that vulnerabilities where the vendor fails to provide a patch at the time of disclosure yield more negative returns than when the vendor discloses a patch. On average, a vendor loses 0.8% more in market value when a patch is not available. This provides evidence as to why vendors are trying to push for legalizing the limited disclosure norms. We also show that vulnerabilities which create confidentiality related breaches result in a greater loss than vulnerabilities which create non-confidentiality related breaches. For example, vendors lose 0.75% less in market value when the vulnerability can lead to a non-confidentiality related breach than when it can lead to a confidentiality related breach. We also find that more severe software vulnerabilities result in a greater loss in market value than less severe vulnerabilities.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, section 2, we provide a literature review. We develop our hypotheses in Section 3. In Section 4, we discuss the methodology of data collection and also describe the event study methodology. In Section 5, we present our results using multivariate regression analysis and test various hypothesis related to how the vulnerability characteristics effect the change in stock prices. Finally, we present the concluding remarks in Section 6.

2. Literature Review

Most prior research on information security discusses the economics of such investments from a customer perspective, rather than from a software vendor perspective (Anderson 2001). Gordon and Loeb (2002) show that firms should make investments in information security far less than the expected loss from a security breach. Gordon et al (2002), Gal-Or and Ghose (2003) discuss the economics of information sharing among firms on security related issues. Prior event study analyses on information security have focused on the change in market value of firms whose systems are breached (Cavusoglu et al (2004) and Kannan, Rees and Sridhar (2004)). These studies show that announcements of a security breach negatively impact the CAR (Cumulative Abnormal Return) of firms whose information systems have been breached. Campbell et al (2003) conduct a similar
event study and find that only the impact of confidentiality related security breaches is negative and significant; the impact of non-confidentiality related security breaches is not significantly different from zero. Hovav and D’Arcy (2003) show similar results by finding that Denial of Service (DoS) type attacks are not associated with any significant loss in value for firms\textsuperscript{5}.

Disclosure of vulnerabilities has been one contentious area. Typically, a major portion of the vulnerabilities is reported by benign independent security analysts (ISA). Since no legal guidelines exists which dictate how vulnerabilities should be handled by the discoverer, some ISAs report the vulnerability to the vendor and give it sufficient time to come up with a patch (The OIS recommends a time period of 30 days to be given to vendors to come up with a patch). However, some other ISAs follow the policy of full disclosure, i.e. they immediately post the vulnerability to a public listing like Bugtraq. One major goal of full disclosure is to eventually force vendors to come up with more secure software. The debate on disclosure policies can be summarized by the following quotes (Applewhite 2000): Jennifer Granick of Stanford University defends full disclosure as “You want a free flow of information, just like in other scientific fields, ideally without betraying important interests.” Scott Blake of OIS opposes full disclosure as, “As soon as you tell one person, you have tipped the balance and people will begin producing exploits.” Some recent academic work is examining this issue more formally. Arora, Telang and Xu (2004) study the optimal timing of vulnerability disclosure and show how disclosure can force vendors to release patches quickly. Kannan and Telang (2004) explore the welfare implications of a market mechanism for software vulnerabilities and report that a market based mechanism for software vulnerabilities always underperforms a CERT-type mechanism.

However none of these studies measures the impact of disclosure on vendor’s market value or profitability. While one major goal of full disclosure is to eventually force vendors to develop secure software, empirically, there is no evidence that suggests that disclosure indeed creates such incentives. Our paper provides an understanding of whether such disclosures create incentives for the vendors to produce secure software in the first place.

\textsuperscript{5} DoS attacks are classified as non-confidential in the Campbell et al (2001) study.
Our methodology follows closely from prior event study analysis. Campbell et al (1997) present a useful summary of the event study analysis highlighting the history as well as the commonly followed methodologies. Event study methodologies are well accepted for studying the implications of public announcements on stock prices. Hendricks and Singhal (1996) study the impact of quality award winning announcements on the market value of firms and observe positive abnormal returns generated by winning a quality award. They further note that awards given by independent organizations and announcements by small firms are more likely to have a significant impact on the firms’ market value. In the field of Information Systems, Subramani and Walden (2001) used event study analyses to show that e-commerce announcements lead to significant increases in the stock price of firms. Chatterjee, Richardson and Zmud (2001) examine the influence of newly announced CIO positions on shareholder wealth. Im, Dow and Grover (2001) examine the changes in market value of a firm in response to IT investment announcements. Bharadwaj and Keil (2003) investigate the impact of IT failures on firms’ market value.

The main contribution of this research is that this is one of the first comprehensive studies, to our knowledge, that has tried to measure the impact of vulnerabilities on software vendors. Thus, we extend prior literature on product defects and confirm that software vendors too suffer a loss in market value when a flaw is discovered in their product. This is inspite of the fact that software vulnerabilities are prevalent among software of almost all major vendors and that vendors face no legal liability if clients suffer losses due to the software flaw. As we noted in the introduction that this has important implications in terms of vendors making investment in software quality as well as policy and legal issues which govern vulnerability disclosures.

3. Hypotheses

Much of the prior literature on product defects (Jarrell and Peltzman (1985), Davidson and Worrell (1992)) shows that generally defective product and recall announcements are associated with loss in market value of a firm. Banker and Slaughter (1998) find that unplanned and critical maintenance activities increase software maintenance costs. Thus, fixing bugs entails cost to firms. For example, the security fixes may cost about $2000-$9000 when done during testing phase. However, they may cost more than 4-8 times when
fixed after the application has been shipped. Slaughter et al (1998) and Westland (2003) suggest that software defects are harder and costlier to fix if discovered later in the software development cycle (e.g. when the product has been shipped to the customer). Moreover, security breach announcements by the user organizations have been known to have a negative impact on the share value for firms. Cavusoglu et al (2004) show that the market capitalization values of firms decreases, on average, by $2.1 billion within two days of a security breach. Cyber insurance firm J.S. Wurzler charges an additional premium to firms for using Windows NT due to the number of security breaches in the software (Gordon, Loeb and Sohail, 2003). Clearly, poor security costs the users of the software. Thus, the cost to the vendor can be written as

\[
\text{Cost of vulnerability disclosure to vendor} = \text{Cost of patching the vulnerability} + \lambda \times (\text{Cost to the users of the software due to exploitation, and/or cost to patch the system})
\]

Here, \( \lambda \) is the internalization factor. That is the user loss that is internalized by the vendor due to lost sale or reputation loss (or liability if imposed in future). Clearly, \( \lambda \) depends on how willing users are to “punish” the vendor, how competitive the market is and the characteristics of vulnerability (Arora, Telang and Xu 2004). For example, this is a typical customer reaction.

"We are extremely concerned by the high amount of vulnerabilities and patches from Microsoft. This goes against the credibility of what they have been saying,"

Michael Kamens, global security director at Thermo Electron Corp.

Given the fact the competitors seem to be using vulnerability disclosure as a strategic way to undermine the rivals’ reputations, it seems that vulnerability disclosure signals a potential loss in future cash flows for a software vendor owing to customer dissatisfaction because customers suffer a loss if their systems get breached. It also signals an increase in product related costs due to the time and effort that the vendor spends in developing a patch or a fix for the flaw. Therefore, we hypothesize that

**H1: A software vendor suffers a loss in market value when a security related vulnerability is announced in its products.**

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6 http://www.sbq.com/sbqrosi/sbq_rosi_software_engineering.pdf
7 http://www.computerworld.com/softwaretopics/os/windows/story/0,10801,92349,00.html
Our second hypothesis pertains to whether the software vendor releases a patch for the product at the time of the vulnerability announcement. As per the popular convention followed in the vulnerabilities market, vendors are given some time to work on a patch for the vulnerability before it is made public. Vendors may also provide a workaround (such as disabling features of the software) when a vulnerability is disclosed and choose to address the vulnerability in a future upgrade. Presence of the patch is also likely to reduce customers’ loss if they apply the patch. Since presence of patch also reflects vendor’s commitment to its customers we expect that vulnerabilities disclosed with a patch will compensate, to an extent, the negative signal due to vulnerability disclosure. Vendors are also pushing for limited disclosures so that they can release the remedial patch in time. This also suggests that patches play a critical role. Therefore our second hypothesis is:

**H2:** \( \text{CAR (Cumulative Abnormal Return) [negative] of a stock is greater for vulnerabilities where the software vendor does not release a patch at the time of the vulnerability disclosure.} \)

The damages suffered by a software vendor’s customers due to a vulnerability in the vendor’s software depend on the type of security breach that the vulnerability facilitates. Campbell et al (2003) classify the security breaches as confidentiality related and non-confidentiality related. Confidentiality related breaches involve attacks where an intruder can gain access into a system and can steal sensitive information. Non-confidentiality related breaches include attacks like denial of service (DoS) attacks where the most likely scenario is a disruption and/or a downtime. Campbell et al (2003) further show that the loss in market value is more for confidentiality related breaches than for non-confidentiality related breaches. Hovav and D’Arcy (2003) show that DoS attacks are not associated with any significant loss in market value for a firm. Therefore we would expect that the vendor loses more market value if the vulnerability in its software causes a confidentiality related breach. The intuition is that the negative reaction due to the vulnerability is more if the customers can potentially suffer greater losses due to the vulnerability. Therefore, our next hypothesis is:

**H3:** \( \text{CAR is greater for a vulnerability which can potentially cause a breach in confidentiality as compared to non-confidentiality related breaches.} \)
The impact of a software flaw on a vendor also depends on how severe the vulnerability is. Davidson and Worrell (1992) conduct an event study with product defect announcements in the tire industry and showed that the impact of severe flaws (which involve a recall) is more than that of less severe flaws (which involve repairs but not recall). Sometimes an ‘exploit’ exists for the vulnerability at the time of announcement. An ‘exploit’ is a piece of code which anyone can use to compromise the security of the software product and subsequently of other information assets. Therefore, we propose our next set of hypotheses as:

**H4a**: The loss in market value of a software vendor is greater if the announced vulnerability has a higher severity.

**H4b**: The loss in market value of a software vendor is greater if an exploit exists publicly at the time of the vulnerability announcement.

A recent article in the Wall Street Journal hinted that firms are using vulnerability disclosure as a strategic weapon against competitors. E.g. ISS disclosed a vulnerability in rival Checkpoint’s flagship firewall product just ahead of Checkpoint’s investor summit. Vendors themselves disclose vulnerability information in their products routinely. In fact, many believe that vendors would prefer not to disclose information at all but they fear that someone else would do it. Generally vendors are likely to be more careful about the disclosure as opposed to third party. Moreover, disclosure by vendors would signal their commitment to providing secure software, we hypothesize that

**H5**: The loss in market value for a software vendor is lower in case the security vulnerability is discovered by the vendor itself rather than by rivals or third party security firms.

Our final hypothesis relates to the publication where vulnerability is reported. Some vulnerabilities are reported in popular press. Others find mention only in industry sources like CERT or technology news portals like news.com. The question which arises is whether both sources are equally influential in affecting a stock’s CAR? One would suspect the popular press of being more influential than industry sources because it reaches a broader audience. So our next hypothesis is:

**H6**: The magnitude of CAR is more when the vulnerability is reported in popular press than in industry sources.
4. Data Description & Methodology

4.1 Vulnerability Disclosure Process

The typical process of vulnerability disclosure takes place as shown in Figure 1.

![Vulnerability Disclosure Process Diagram]

**Figure 1: Vulnerability Discovery and Disclosure**

The process starts with the vulnerability discovery. There are various sources for vulnerability discovery. Some vulnerabilities are discovered by amateur researchers or by independent security analysts (ISA) like eEye Security. If the ISA chooses to follow ‘limited disclosure’, it reports the vulnerability to the concerned vendor or to an independent body like CERT who disclose the vulnerability to public later (generally after
the fix has been made available) in a limited way\(^8\). Sometimes, the vendor itself might discover a vulnerability in its products. On the other hand, if the ISA chooses to follow ‘full disclosure’ or if a hacker discovers the vulnerability, the vulnerability may get announced directly to public. Forums such as Bugtraq allow for full disclosure of vulnerability information. In any case, after the vulnerability has been announced, investors might re-evaluate their projections on the software vendors’ profitability based on the vulnerability characteristics. Consequentially, the stock price of the vendor might show an abnormal return due to the vulnerability announcement.

4.2 Data

Our data comes from the vulnerability disclosures in popular press as well as from the advisory reports in CERT. We include articles published by news networks like Businesswire, Newswire and daily articles in popular press like WSJ, NY Times, Washington Post and LA Times. We search for these news articles in Proquest and Lexis-Nexis Academic databases which, between them, maintain news articles from major newspapers and news networks all over the country. We also include articles from news.com which is a CNET owned site and is a premier source for round-the-clock, breaking technology news coverage. We used the following terms in our search: ‘vulnerability AND disclosure’, ‘software AND vulnerability’, ‘software AND flaw’, ‘virus AND vulnerability’ & ‘vulnerability AND patch’.

We also searched the vulnerability announcements for information on the type of vulnerabilities. Based on this, we classify vulnerabilities into various categories.

- If the announcements contained words such as ‘serious’ or ‘severe’ or ‘dangerous’ to describe the vulnerability, we characterized the vulnerability as ‘Severe’. If the announcement characterized the vulnerability as ‘moderately severe’ or ‘with low severity’, we characterized it as ‘Non-severe’.
- The vulnerability announcements also had references to what kind to security breach could be facilitated if attackers exploited the vulnerability. If the vulnerability contained terms such as ‘cause denial of service’, or ‘disrupt operations’, we classified the vulnerability as type ‘DoS’; otherwise if the vulnerability contained terms such as ‘gain

\(^8\) CERT then reports the vulnerability to the respective vendor and gives it time (typically 45 days) to come out with a patch.
access’ or ‘steal information’ or ‘take control’, we classified the vulnerability as ‘Confidentiality Related’.

- Further, the announcements also described whether the vendor released a patch at the time of the vulnerability announcement. If the vendor announced a patch at the time of vulnerability disclosure, we classified the vulnerability as ‘Fix Available’.

- Finally, we also classify vulnerabilities on whether an ‘exploit’ exists for the vulnerability in the public domain. If the vulnerability announcement contained terms such as ‘an exploit for the vulnerability is circulating’, we classify the vulnerability as type ‘Exploit’.

As per convention in prior event study literature (Hendricks & Singhal 1996), we excluded the following type of announcements from our sample:

- Vulnerability announcements in non-daily periodicals like magazines because of the difficulty in determining the exact date of the announcement.

- Repeat announcements of the same event in a different publication at a later date. In case of such repeat announcements, the earliest announcement date was chosen as the event day.

- Announcements which were associated with other confounding events like stock splits and mergers on the event date.

- Announcements related to firms not traded on any public exchange in the US.

- Announcements that point to a fundamental protocol flaw rather than a particular software. E.g. a flaw in the FTP protocol affects multiple vendors. The reason behind dropping this category is that the flaw exists in the software only because it follows a flawed protocol, and not due to the vendor.

- Software flaws which are not security related.

Our dataset contains 146 vulnerability announcements pertaining to around 18 firms in the time period January 1999 – May 2004. We capture information on the following details about the vulnerability announcement: date, firm name, product, who discovered the flaw, news source, whether patch is available and severity. The descriptive statistics of the data are given in Table 1.
The year-wise distribution of announcements is given in Table 2 below.

### Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Announcements</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>22</td>
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<td>2002</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004 (till May 30)</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**4.3 Methodology**

We use the standard event study methodology for this analysis. An event study assumes that returns on a stock are significantly impacted by an event of interest (in our case, the event of interest is the vulnerability disclosure announcement). The period of interest for which we observe the event is known as the event window. The smallest event window is one day (day of the announcement or day ‘0’). In practice, the event window is often expanded to include two days (day 0 and day 1) to capture the effect of price announcements made after the close of the markets on a particular day. Sometimes

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9 If an announcement is made on a day when the markets are closed, we consider the next day when the markets open as day 0.
10 Day 1 is the day after the announcement.
researchers include a day before the announcements to incorporate any information leaks about the event. In our study we define a one day event window (day 0)\(^\text{11}\). Hendricks and Singhal (1996) cite two reasons to use a one day event period. One, a shorter event period permits a better estimation of the effects of information of stock prices since it reduces the possibility of other confounding factors not related to the announcement. Two, it also increases the power of the statistical tests.

Abnormal returns are defined as the difference between the actual return of the stock over the event window minus the expected return of the stock over the event window. The expected return on the stock is calculated in several ways, but in our analysis, we use the market model which assumes a stable linear relation between the market return and the return on the stock. We also verify our results using other methods such as the market-adjusted method and the mean-adjusted method. The coefficients of the linear model are calculated by choosing a portion of the data as the estimation window. The estimation window, generally between 120 days and 200 days used in most studies, is the period immediately before the event window. In our case, we use an estimation window of size 160 days, from day -175 to day -16.

There are three main methods followed in the event study methodology (Campbell, Andrew and MacKinlay, 1997; Hendricks and Singhal, 1996) to estimate the abnormal returns.

1. The Market Model

   In the market model, the abnormal returns are estimated as follows:

   \[
   AR_{it} = R_{it} - \alpha - \beta_{it} \cdot R_{mt} \quad (1)
   \]

   where \(i\) denotes the event (\(i=1,2,\ldots,N\)), \(m\) denotes the market and \(t\) denotes the day of the event (e.g. \(t=0\) denotes the day of the vulnerability announcement.). \(AR_{it}\) denotes the abnormal return of event \(i\) at time \(t\), \(R_{it}\) denotes the actual return and \(R_{mt}\) denotes the market return at time period \(t\)\(^\text{12}\). \(\alpha + \beta_{it} \cdot R_{mt}\) denotes the normal return of the firm due to the market-wide movement. The abnormal return is defined as the difference between the actual return and the normal return. This is the part of the actual return that cannot be

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\(^{11}\) We also highlight our results using different values of the event window.

\(^{12}\) \(R_{it}\) for a stock is the percent change in the stock price at time \(t\), \((=P_{it} - P_{it-1})/P_{it-1}\)

\(^{13}\) We obtain the data on the stock and market returns from Yahoo Finance(\(http://finance.yahoo.com\))
explained by market movements and captures the effect of the event. Since most of the tech stocks are listed on NASDAQ, we use this as our indicator for market returns. We use ordinary least squares regression to estimate the coefficients $\alpha$ and $\beta$ for the above regression.

2. The Market Adjusted Model

In this case, the abnormal returns are given as

$$ AR_{it} = R_{it} - R_{mt} $$

where the terms have the usual meaning as in the Market Model.

3. The Mean Adjusted Model

$$ AR_{it} = R_{it} - \overline{R}_i $$

where $\overline{R}_i = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{j=1}^{T} R_{ij}$ is the mean return on the stock which made a vulnerability announcement during event $i$, over the duration of the estimation period and $T$ is number of days in the estimation period (in our study, $T=160$).

The mean abnormal return across all observations on day $t$ of the event is given as $\overline{A}_t = \sum_{i=1}^{N} AR_{it}$. The cumulative abnormal return $CAR = \sum_{event} \overline{A}_t$ for the event is defined as the sum of the abnormal returns over the event window. Prior research on event studies (Brown & Warner 1980, Brown & Warner 1985) presents a comprehensive analysis of suitable test statistics for the abnormal mean return. Since vulnerabilities were disclosed by more than one vendor on a given day, our statistic should allow for event day clustering. The following t-statistic proposed by Brown & Warner (1985) takes in to account event day clustering as well as cross-sectional dependence in the security specific excess returns.

$$ t = \frac{\overline{A}_t}{\sqrt{\frac{S^2_A}{T}}} $$

where $S^2_A = \frac{1}{T-1} \left( \sum_{i=1}^{T} (\overline{A}_i - \overline{A}) \right)$ and $T$ is the number of days in the estimation period and $\overline{A} = \frac{1}{T} \left( \sum_{i=1}^{T} \overline{A}_i \right)$.
The null hypothesis is that the abnormal returns are not significantly different from zero. Under the null hypothesis, the abnormal returns are independent and identically distributed and normal with a mean of zero and the variance given by the variance of abnormal returns over the estimation period.

We also do multivariate regression and test our hypothesis of how CAR varies with various vendors, or vulnerability characteristics. But before we present the details on our regression analysis, we present the results of the event study.

4.2 Event Study Results

Table 3 summarizes the results of our event study and quantifies the effect of vulnerability disclosures on the stock prices of software vendors for our entire sample of 146 announcements (p-values are in parenthesis)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Day 0</th>
<th>CAR</th>
<th>Market Model</th>
<th>Market Adjusted Model</th>
<th>Mean Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean Abnormal Return</td>
<td>-0.63 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.67 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.5 (0.09)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Abnormal Return</td>
<td>-0.44 (0.00)</td>
<td>-0.5 (0.00)</td>
<td>-0.55 (0.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Less than Zero</td>
<td>64% (0.00)</td>
<td>63.5% (0.001)</td>
<td>58.7% (0.03)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We calculate CARs under there different models (Market Model, Market Adjusted Model and Mean Adjusted Model). For each of the three models, we use three different test statistics (Mean Abnormal Return, Median Abnormal Return and Percent Less than Zero). The Mean Abnormal Return Test (equations (1) to (4)) is parametric in nature and makes assumptions about the distribution of abnormal returns. We also use two non-parametric tests to strengthen our results. One, we use the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test to calculate the p-value for the median abnormal return; two we use the Sign Test to calculate the p-value for the percent negative returns. The Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test tests whether the median of the abnormal returns is different than zero. The Sign Test is based on the sign rather than the magnitude of the abnormal returns and requires that under the null hypothesis, the proportion of abnormal returns greater than (or less than) zero is 50%.

From Table 3, we note that the CAR for day 0 is negative across all the three different models. E.g. the Mean Abnormal Return varies between 0.5% - 0.67% depending on the
model used. Further the Market Model and the Market Adjusted Model are statistically significant at $p < 0.01$, while the Mean Adjusted Model is statistically significant at $p < 0.1$ level. The Median Abnormal Returns range between 0.44% - 0.55% and are significant at the 0.01 level. Finally, the percent observations less than zero range between 57.8% - 64% and are significant at the 0.05 level. It is clear that CAR is negative and statistically significant for all three models and all three tests.

Thus, our results suggest that software vendors do tend to lose market value when a vulnerability is announced in their product. To check for the robustness of our results, we not only test the mean abnormal returns, but also the median abnormal returns and the percent less than zero. This provides support for hypothesis $H1$ that vulnerability announcements are associated with a loss in market value of software vendors.

We also calculate the abnormal returns using different event windows (beyond 0 days) using the market model (the results do not change substantially for other models). The results are given in Table 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Day</th>
<th>-1</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>0 to 1</th>
<th>0 to 2</th>
<th>0 to 5</th>
<th>0 to 10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAR (p-value)</td>
<td>0.25 (0.4)</td>
<td>-0.63 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.65 (0.07)</td>
<td>-0.47 (0.35)</td>
<td>-0.25 (0.7)</td>
<td>-0.8 (0.36)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the table, it is clear that the CAR on day 0 is negative and significant at the 0.01 level. However, CAR for day 0 and day 1 combined is significant only at the 0.1 level. This suggests that the stock market is efficient in the sense that the effect of a software vulnerability announcement is quickly incorporated into a vendors’ stock price. The p-values for day -1 is not statistically significant. A possible explanation for this is that the effect of news leakage through forums like SecurityFocus is not significant. The CARs in columns 3, 4, 5 and 6 are negative but not statistically significant. However, it is interesting to note that the CARs are negative for even a 10 day window. Figure 2 shows the CAR over a 16 day event window (from day -5 to day 10).
Our result corroborates prior work on defective products (Jarrell et al 1985, Davidson et al 1992) by showing that product defects lead to a loss in market value of a firm. Our study analyzes returns on stocks of software vendors and we find that a defective software which compromises the security of customers’ information systems leads to a negative impact on the market value of the software vendor. The extent of losses suffered by a vendor, on average, is moderate at about 0.63% of its market capitalization value on the day the vulnerability gets announced.

**Market Capitalization**

We also calculated the abnormal change in market capitalization values of the software vendor due to the vulnerability announcement\(^{14}\). For each firm, the day 0 change in market capitalization value was calculated by multiplying the day -1 market capitalization value with the abnormal returns on day 0. On average, we calculate that the software vendors in our sample lost $0.86 billion in market capitalization value on the day of the vulnerability disclosure. Since Microsoft accounts for more than 40% of our sample, we sub-divide our sample into Microsoft and non-Microsoft samples. For the Microsoft sample, the average

\(^{14}\)We obtain the market capitalization values from the CSRP database by multiplying the share price with the number of shares outstanding.
change in market capitalization is around $0.92 billion and for the non-Microsoft sample, the average change in market value is $0.81 billion.

**Robustness Checks:** We also perform the following robustness checks on our results, as specified in the event study by Cooper, Dimitrov and Rau (2001).

1. **Robustness to Outliers:**

To check the robustness of our results to exclude the effect of outliers, we compute the CAR for our sample after excluding the top 10 percentile and the bottom 10 percentile of observations (ranked according to the day 0 mean abnormal returns). We find that our results remain qualitatively the same. For example, mean abnormal returns for this sample are 0.53% (against 0.63% for the entire sample) and these are significant at the 5% level. This suggests that our results are robust to outliers in the data.

2. **Momentum Effect:**

It can be argued that the day 0 abnormal returns are caused simply by market momentum than by the underlying event. As a simple check, we compute the correlation between the abnormal returns before the event and those after the event. In specific, we check the pair-wise correlation (along with level of significance) for three pairs of values: one, day -10 to day -1 CAR and day 0 to day 10 CAR; two, day -10 to day -1 CAR and day 0 CAR; and three, day -1 CAR and day 0 CAR. The pair-wise correlations are as follows:

- day -10 to day -1 CAR and day 0 to day 10 CAR (*correlation: 0.13, p-value 0.12*)
- day -10 to day -1 CAR and day 0 CAR (*correlation: -0.05, p-value 0.5*)
- day -1 CAR and day 0 CAR (*correlation: 0.03, p-value 0.67*)

Thus we find that none of the correlations is strong or significant at the 10% level and hence the momentum in the stock prices does not seem to be driving our results.

5. **Regression Analysis**

To test the other hypothesis, we develop both a regression model and simple means test to explain the effect of various vulnerability characteristics on abnormal returns. However, ordinary least squares model might not be appropriate because it does not account for heterogeneity among firms. The issue of heterogeneity is an important consideration in analyzing panel data. For example, the level of abnormal returns could differ across firms if investors use different valuation models across firms (Malatesta and Thompson 1985).
Estimating aggregate parameters while ignoring heterogeneity could lead to biased and inconsistent estimates (Hsiao 1986).

To incorporate the impact of firm specific heterogeneity in our data, we propose a fixed effects model. The fixed effects model controls for unobservable firm specific variables that are constant over time. This is equivalent to generating dummy variables for each firm and including them in an ordinary linear regression to control for firm specific effects. The fixed effects model can be specified as:

\[ y_{it} = X_{it} \cdot \beta + \mu_i + \epsilon_{it} \]  

(5)

where \( i = 1 \ldots N \) (\( N \) is the total number of firms) and \( t = 1 \ldots T \) (\( T \) is the total number of events). \( y_{it} \) is the Abnormal Return (\( AR_{it} \)) for firm \( i \) at event \( t \) as calculated according to the market model in equation (1).\(^{15}\) \( X_{it} \) are the independent variables which capture the various vulnerability characteristics, \( u_i \) is the firm specific dummy variable. The description of the independent variables is as follows:

**SEVR**: whether the vulnerability has been classified as severe; \( SEVR = 1 \) for a severe vulnerability and 0 otherwise.

**PATCH**: Whether a patch is available at the time of the vulnerability disclosure. \( PATCH = 1 \) if a patch is available and 0 otherwise.

**DISC**: Whether the vulnerability was disclosed by the third party. \( DISC = 1 \) if the vulnerability was disclosed by the third party and 0 if disclosed by the vendor.

**EXPLOIT**: If an exploit is publicly available at the time of the vulnerability announcement, then \( EXPLOIT = 1 \); otherwise it is zero.

**CERT**: If the vulnerability was first reported in CERT, then \( CERT = 1 \), it is 0 otherwise.

**PRESS**: If the vulnerability was first reported in popular press, the variable \( PRESS = 1 \), otherwise it is zero.\(^{16}\)

**DOS**: If the vulnerability can potentially lead to a denial of service type attack or a disruption in services, then the variable \( DOS = 1 \), otherwise it is zero.

**Effect of Investor Sentiments:**

\(^{15}\) Since the market model is the most common model used in event studies, we proceed with the remaining analysis with this model.

\(^{16}\) For PRESS and CERT, we compare with the baseline case that the vulnerability was reported at the CNET/ZDNET owned news.com website.
To control for abnormal returns due to overall market sentiments, we introduce a set of dummy variables based on the time when the vulnerability was announced. We use the events surrounding 9/11 as the basis for segmenting our sample into various time periods. The stock market crash in late 2000 could also play a role in the negative abnormal returns. We introduce the following dummy variables in our model:

**Post_911**: If the vulnerability was announced within a year of 9/11, i.e. if the date of the announcement was between Sept 11, 2001 and Sept, 11 2002. This constitutes 19 observations from our sample.

**Pre_911**: If the vulnerability was announced within a year before 9/11, i.e. if the date of the announcement was between Sept 11, 2000 and Sept, 11 2001. This was also the time after the stock market crashed in mid 2000 and lasted till the first three quarters of 2001 (Wall Street Journal, 2000\textsuperscript{17}, Kannan et al 2003, Wall Street Journal, 2003\textsuperscript{18}). This constitutes 28 observations from our sample.

**Year_99-00**: if the announcement was made prior to September 11, 2000, i.e. if the date of the announcement is between Jan 1, 1999 and September 11, 2000. This constitutes 23 observations from our sample.

**Year_02-03**: If the date of the announcement is between September 11, 2002 and September 11, 2003. This constitutes 44 observations from our sample.

**Year_03-04**: If the date of the announcement is between September 11, 2003 and June 1, 2004. This constitutes 32 observations from our sample. This is the baseline category for our regression.

### 5.1 Results

We first compare the mean CARs of different sub samples based on vulnerability characteristics to understand how various factors affect market value of the firms. The characteristics that we consider are explained above. This is similar to the method followed by Subramani and Walden (2001), Chatterjee, Richardson and Zmud (2001) Im, Dow and Grover (2001). The results are summarized in Table 5.

\textsuperscript{17} Article titled ‘The Internet Bubble Broke Records, Rules and Bank Accounts’ dated 07/14/2000
\textsuperscript{18} Article titled ‘Thinking Things Over: On Repairing Economic Damage’ dated 03/10/2003
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vulnerability Characteristic</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>CAR</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Severity</strong></td>
<td>High Severity (81%)</td>
<td>-0.76</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low Severity (19%)</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Source of Discovery</strong></td>
<td>Discovered by Vendor (36%)</td>
<td>-0.95</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Discovered by Third Party (64%)</td>
<td>-0.47</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Patch Availability</strong></td>
<td>Patch Available (24%)</td>
<td>-0.37</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Patch Not Available (76%)</td>
<td>-1.49</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Source of Disclosure</strong></td>
<td>CERT (34%)</td>
<td>-0.47</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Press (35%)</td>
<td>-0.98</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>News.com (30%)</td>
<td>-0.47</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of Attack Possible</strong></td>
<td>Denial of Service (24%)</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>-0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Confidentiality (76%)</td>
<td>-0.78</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Microsoft vs Non Microsoft</strong></td>
<td>Microsoft (46%)</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non Microsoft (54%)</td>
<td>-0.91</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the means analysis it is clear that more severe vulnerabilities affect the stock price more. Surprisingly, when vendors disclose the information then the investors seem to perceives it more negatively than when some third party releases it. As expected, availability of patch mitigates the negative impact of disclosure somewhat. Since the vendors typically disclose the information with a patch, we may find during the multivariate regression that vendor release effect may disappear. The source of disclosure is also relevant. Investors seem to pay more attention to vulnerabilities published in mainstream newspapers than to CERT. Confidentally breaches are considered more severe and hence have higher significant impact than denial of service vulnerabilities. Finally, we do not find an evidence of Microsoft effect though, non-Microsoft firms seem to lose more value.
In the second method, we test our hypothesis related to the impact of various vulnerability characteristics on the market value of a software vendor using the multivariate regression model outlined in equation (5). This is similar to the methodology followed by prior event studies such as Hendricks and Singhal (1997), Chatterjee, Richardson and Zmud (2001), Lane and Robertson (1995). The regression method has the advantage over the sub-sample method used in Table 5 that the regression method captures the effect of all the independent variables simultaneously. The sub-sample method could give spurious results because the effects of a sub-sample, such as patch vs no-patch, can be explained by a relationship between patch and other independent variables. The parameter estimates as well as the \( p \)-values for the various parameters of our fixed effects regression are given in the Table 6 below.

**Table 6: Regression Estimates**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>( p )-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SEVR</td>
<td>-0.006*</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXPLOIT</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PATCH</td>
<td>0.0083*</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISC</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERT</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRESS</td>
<td>-0.0053</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>0.0076*</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y_99-00</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre_911</td>
<td>-0.011*</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post_911</td>
<td>-0.02*</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y_02-03</td>
<td>-0.01*</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.01*</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The \( R^2 \) for this regression is 16.6%. The F-test (\( p \)-value 0.001) for the overall model suggests that our model is highly significant. The constant in the regression is simply the average of all the fixed effects in the model. Our regression provides several interesting observations regarding the effect of the vulnerability characteristics on the stock price of the vendor.
1. **Severity:** The coefficient on the $SEVR$ variable in Table 6 is negative and significant (though at $p = 0.1$). This is consistent with results in Table 5. More severe vulnerabilities have a higher potential to cause damage and hence have a larger adverse impact on CAR. On average, a severe vulnerability can cost a software vendor 0.6% more than a non-severe vulnerability, providing support to hypothesis $H4$.

2. **Patch:** We also find that the non-availability of a patch is positive and significantly correlated with the market value. This provides support to hypothesis $H2$ because the coefficient on the $PATCH$ variable suggests that on average, firms which do not provide a patch at the time of the vulnerability disclosure suffer a loss of 0.83% more than firms which provide a patch.

3. **Confidentiality:** The coefficient of the $DOS$ variable is 0.0076. This implies that vulnerabilities which result in a non-confidential breach (denial of service, disruptions in service) have an abnormal return of 0.76% higher than the vulnerabilities which result in a confidentiality-related breach. This confirms our hypothesis $H3$.

   None of the other coefficients are significant (except time coefficients). Thus our results fail to provide support for hypothesis $H5$ and $H6$. From table 5 also, we can observe that none of the sub-samples (other than the Press sub-sample) has a significant coefficient.

   The rejection of hypothesis $H5$ is especially interesting because it suggests that the markets do not penalize a vendor any more if the vulnerability is discovered by a third party than by the vendor itself.

   We also control for the effect of the time period during which the vulnerabilities were announced to control for time-specific investor sentiments which can affect abnormal returns. We find that software vendors suffered the greatest abnormal returns in the one year period post 9/11; for example, on average, vendors lost 2% more in market value for each vulnerability announcement in the year following 9/11 than they did in the baseline period (2003-04). This suggests that security concerns among investors were highest during this period, as an aftermath of September 11. The next highest period of abnormal returns was the one-year time frame after the dot-com crash, i.e. from Sept 2000 to Sept 2001. In this period, software vendors lost, on average, 1.0% more on vulnerability announcements than in the baseline period. The results also suggest that year 2003-04 is when the vendors suffered the least. It is possible that vulnerability announcements have
become commonplace and are not affecting the vendors as much. But, more research is needed to provide a definitive answer.

6. Conclusions and Discussion

To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to analyze the impact of product defects on software vendors. We also analyze the information content of the vulnerability disclosure announcement and classify vulnerabilities into various sub-types based on the following characteristics: the source of vulnerability disclosure, severity of the vulnerability, availability of a fix, whether an exploit was publicly available at the time of discovery, the type of security breach caused by the vulnerability and the source of vulnerability discovery. Our results show that vulnerability disclosure leads to a significant loss of market value for software vendors. This indicates that the stock markets react negatively to the news of a vulnerability disclosure, because the discovery of a vulnerability could suggest a loss in future cash flow of the software vendors. Software vulnerabilities affect the cash flows of a vendor in two main ways: One, the vendor has to spend time and effort in providing a patch for the vulnerability, which increases the overall cost of the software product and hence reduces profits. Vulnerabilities may also lead to customer dissatisfaction because the customer has to spend time and effort in installing patches and is exposed to a risk of security related attacks. This could further lead to customers shifting to competitor’s products and hence reduces the cash flow for the vendors’ products. This has implications for software vendors to invest in improving the quality of their software. While vendors would like to launch software products as soon as possible, our study shows that vendors need to focus testing in areas that can potentially contain greater number of security vulnerabilities. We also show that the effect of a vulnerability announcement is quickly incorporated into the stock price and after the second day, there is no significant impact on the stock prices. We check for the robustness of our results in terms of checking for outliers and checking for momentum effects in the stock returns. We find that our results are also robust to the effect of investor sentiments since we control for the effect of various time periods in our regression.

Our study also provides preliminary evidence that firms should integrate security into software quality practices. In a firm with limited resources, this would mean focusing testing efforts in areas that have a greater number of security vulnerabilities. Although
researchers in computer science have stressed on this fact (McGraw 2004), there hardly exists any literature in software engineering economics which measures the return on investment of incorporating security based metrics in software quality or software risk assessment. While software quality traditionally deals with functional testing, complete security testing would incorporate non-functional testing well, i.e. subjecting the software to misspecified input streams (Potter and McGraw 2004).

Our results also show that vulnerabilities which are severe or which can cause a confidentiality related attack are likely to result in a greater loss in market value for a vendor. This has implications for the software vendor in terms of allocating resources for software testing and quality improvements. For example, vendors should focus on spending more resources in testing those software modules where a flaw is more likely to cause a confidentiality related breach. Campbell et al (2003) show that confidentiality related breaches cause a greater loss to firms; we complement that result by showing that software vulnerabilities which cause a confidentiality related breach are likely to result in a greater loss in market value for the vendor.

**Comparison with prior event studies:**

It is interesting to compare how the abnormal returns in our event study compare with results in prior event studies. Specifically, we compare our results with event studies in the following categories: security breach related announcements, IT investment related announcements and product defect related announcements.

Table-7 shows that our results are comparable to prior studies on product defects and product recall announcements. It is especially interesting to note that the loss in market value that vendors suffer due to a security vulnerability is much less than that suffered by firms during a security breach. A possible reason could be that software vendors are protected by click-wrap agreements and have only limited liability for any flaw in their products. Another reason is that firms usually supply a patch with the vulnerability disclosure (almost 76% of observations in our sample have a patch available at the time of disclosure). Therefore security breaches are not so much caused due to unprotected vulnerabilities as due to lack of adequate patching done by firms. E.g. the SQL Slammer virus, which affected millions of servers worldwide, was created when hackers exploited a six month old vulnerability in SQL. Microsoft had already released a patch for the same,
but, as demonstrated by the Slammer, many firms had not adequately protected their servers by applying the patch.

### Table 7: Summary of previous event studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification of Event Study</th>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>CAR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Impact of Product Recall Announcements</td>
<td>Jarrell G and S Peltzman (1985)</td>
<td>1967-1981</td>
<td>-0.81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Davidson WL III and DL Worrell (1992)</td>
<td>1968-1987</td>
<td>-0.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact of IT Investment Announcements</td>
<td>Chatterjee D, Richardson VJ and RW Zmud (2001)</td>
<td>1987-1998</td>
<td>1.16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dos Santos BL, Peffers K and DC Mauer (1993)</td>
<td>1981-1988</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact of Winning a Quality Award</td>
<td>Hendricks KB and Singhal VR (1996)</td>
<td>1985-1991</td>
<td>0.59%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Not Significant at the 10% level

**Implications for Software Quality and Disclosure Policy**

As we noted in introduction, one major argument given by the full disclosure group is that it will eventually force the vendors to improve the quality of their product. From our analysis, there seems to be some support for this argument. Disclosure, in general (with or without a patch) adversely affects the market valuation of the vendors. It is more severe in case of without patch (which is what generally happens during full disclosure). Thus, disclosure clearly creates some incentives for vendors to produce better quality software.
However, market value is only one metric to capture the impact of disclosure. A more interesting and comprehensive work would be to measure the impact of disclosure on profit or market share of these firms. But our paper does provide a starting point for why we should analyze this issue in more detail. Another potential area of future research would be to capture and test the link between security based risks and the quality of software systems.

From our discussion, it is also clear why vendors are pushing for a limited disclosure policy. Recently, Organization for Internet Safety (OIS), which is consortia of 11 large software vendors, announced a limited-disclosure policy which requires the discoverer to notify the vendors and give them some time before making the information public. From our analysis, such a policy benefits vendors because limited disclosure gives them time to release a patch for the vulnerability and availability of patch mitigates some adverse effects of disclosure. We also find that whether the vulnerability is reported by vendors themselves, or other parties, it has essentially similar impact on market value. To an extent, our study points that vendors are not necessarily better off disclosing information themselves. Generally, an argument could be made that vendors should release the information themselves, for if not, someone else will and it will lead to worse consequences. However, we do not find any evidence of this. Vendors may be better off keeping quiet and integrate their fixes as either service packs (which do not give micro-details on what it fixes) or newer versions and announce the patch only if someone else has disclosed it. However, more research is required; especially more data on announcements when hackers exploit the vulnerabilities.

Another issue raised in discussing software flaws is whether software vendors should be held responsible by law for vulnerabilities discovered in their products. Currently, the use of End User License Agreements (EULA or Click-Wrap Agreements) that come with software products limit the liability that vendors face if customers suffer a loss due to a flaw in software. Our results show that liability laws (which anyway are not likely to pass sometimes soon) are not the only way to ‘punish’ software vendors for flaws discovered in their products. Market seems to act on this information and punishes a vendor, who on an average, loses around 0.63% of its market value on the day a vulnerability is reported in its
products. Software liability could certainly cause the market value of the vendors to decline further if a vulnerability is reported in their product.

Some vulnerabilities are posted on a public listing such as Bugtraq before these are announced in popular press or CERT. In that case, the actual vulnerability announcement may have little surprise value. Therefore our results are a lower bound for the actual decrease in stock prices experienced by the software vendor if a flaw is reported in its product. We do not include the vulnerabilities reported on Bugtraq since most of these are not confirmed vulnerabilities at the time they are posted online.

A limitation of our study is that most of the data points in our sample are announcements regarding off-the-shelf software products. Our analysis does not cover software development projects where a security flaw can cause millions of dollars worth of damage. The main reason for excluding them was the lack of availability of data on software failures in such cases. We also reiterate that further analysis in terms of software quality, market share or profitability is needed to fully understand how vulnerability disclosure signals poorer quality and how it affects the vendors’ incentives to provide better quality software. Our paper takes the first step in this direction.

References

• Chatterjee D, Richardson VJ and RW Zmud (2001) ‘Examining the Shareholder Wealth Effects of Announcements of Newly Created CIO Positions’, *MIS Quarterly, 25(1),* 43-70