

Soviet Nostalgia: An Impediment to Russian Democratization

This fall marks the one-year anniversary of Ukraine's "Orange Revolution," when popular protests against fraudulent elections led to non-violent regime change. Ukraine's came on the heels of other similar revolutions, in Georgia in 2003 and Serbia in 2000, leading many to wonder whether Russia will be next. The Russian government actually plays a major role in manufacturing such speculation, all the while stirring up anxiety and paranoia. The Kremlin views these revolutions as the outcome of efforts by Western intelligence agencies to undermine Russia. Every couple of weeks, a Kremlin insider, on occasion even President Vladimir Putin himself, warns of the sinister motivations behind foreign assistance. "We understand that you dance with the one who brought you," Putin remarked recently.¹ Russian journalists and pundits obediently echo this alarmist refrain. Major business and Orthodox Church leaders, not to be out of step with the Kremlin bosses, have answered the call to defend the motherland against such threats. This past spring, they founded Nashi, a pro-Kremlin youth organization, and funded several weeks of summer camp for 3,000 of its recruits. The organizers clearly intended that the camp would not only provide opportunities to sing around the campfire and swim in the lake, but also to discipline and indoctrinate members of Nashi ("Ours" in Russian), inoculating them from "their" (foreign) ideas and activities.

Yet, the U.S. democracy promotion advocates that the Kremlin worries about are themselves puzzled and anxious. In policy circles and donor meetings, some gingerly approach the issue of whether something akin to an Orange Revolution is possible in Russia. Although no one is brazen enough to embrace such a goal publicly, some privately wonder what it would take and

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The Washington Quarterly • 29:1 pp. 83–96.

how much it would cost to support one, given Russia's 11 time zones and current inhospitable political conditions. The case for why U.S. taxpayer dollars should support anything connected to the disdained and gutted Russian political party or electoral system is especially difficult to make. Yet we frequently hear U.S. government officials remarking that they cannot simply ignore the democrats in Russia and have to do something related to elections.

For different reasons, the Kremlin advisers and Western democracy advocates are both off the mark. No dramatic revolution in Russia is likely to come soon from below or outside. Multiple, random sample surveys we have conducted in Russia since 2001 indicate that many Russians are simply too ambivalent about democracy for any revolutionary scenario to be plausible. Support for concepts such as transparency and the rule of law, as well as free and fair elections, are greatly inhibited by the power of historical legacies. Widely held, uncritical views of the past shape Russia's political and social development today. If left unaddressed, they threaten to drive a deep wedge between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community.

To date, Western democracy assistance has overwhelmingly supported the building of institutions associated with democracy, such as political parties, independent media, and nongovernmental groups.² Donors have devoted relatively little attention to the ideas that underpin such institutions. The survey findings suggest to us that Western assistance should be reoriented to promote basic democratic principles as well as public understanding of how Russia's recent history has undermined or reinforced these ideas. Today, many Russians show symptoms of collective amnesia about the past, and a majority of young Russians believe Joseph Stalin (1929–1953) did more good than bad. Although intellectuals in many countries complain that the next generation in their own countries do not receive adequate training in history, in Russia this “absent memory” appears to have political consequences.³ As long as they remain positively inclined toward Stalin, young Russians are unlikely to embrace concepts such as justice and human rights. The failure of robust democratic institutions to develop, coupled with a lack of understanding of the past, has left Russians uneducated about democracy, ambivalent about Stalin, and confused about Russia's place in the world.

Listening to Young Russians

We make this argument drawing on a unique set of nationally representative surveys we have overseen in Russia since 2001, all of which relied on scientific sampling methods. The most recent survey, conducted in June 2005,

asked approximately 80 questions of 2,000 Russians, ages 16–29, concerning a variety of issues related to democracy, authoritarianism, political participation, and views of Stalin.⁴ In all official Russian statistics, “youth” refers to the cohort under 30. Conventional wisdom suggests this generation is the most likely to support values and norms associated with democracy. We find that young Russians, however, do not conform to these expectations.

Although the Orange Revolution in Ukraine has turned a bit sour, with President Victor Yushenko having dismissed his government in September 2005 over charges of corruption, many in the West were deeply moved last year by the scenes of students taking to the street to protest electoral fraud. Young Russians were not. As we were preparing our youth survey, we witnessed a striking lack of interest expressed by university student participants in four focus groups conducted in Moscow and in Yaroslavl, a nearby provincial capital, in December 2004. Overwhelmingly, these young people voiced great skepticism about the events in Ukraine. Echoing the views of the Kremlin, they attributed protests in the street to interference by foreign intelligence agencies.

The June 2005 youth survey data confirmed that most young Russians share this skepticism. About 72 percent of respondents said they definitely do not want an Orange Revolution to take place in Russia, and 17 percent said they probably not do want it to occur. Only 3 percent favored such a development. Again, reflecting the Kremlin line, the majority of survey respondents thought Ukrainians participated in events mainly because they were paid, presumably by foreigners, to do so. If many in the West saw Ukrainian “people power,” students in the street cheering for justice through the ballot box, many young Russians perceived conspiratorial encirclement designed to hurt Russia. These views are reminiscent of what we had hoped was a long-gone era.

Perhaps young Russians, similar to young people in many countries, are generally indifferent toward politics and have very little interest in joining any organized activities, including those run by the Kremlin’s Nashi. Indeed, despite widespread national television coverage of Nashi rallies with tens of thousands of attendees in downtown Moscow, only about 19 percent of respondents had heard of this group. Among them, only 2 percent are currently members, and only 17 percent say they want to join, suggesting that overall only about 3 percent of Russian youth have an interest in joining Nashi. These numbers are almost identical to the number of young Russians

Western assistance should be reoriented to promote basic democratic principles.

who have heard of and would join one of Russia's oldest human rights organizations, Memorial, dedicated in part to an exploration of the Stalinist past and memorializing those who perished in the Gulag. By far the least recognized of the groups we asked about was Pora ("It's Time!"), the youth movement seminal in Ukraine's revolution, which established a branch in Russia in early 2005. Only 4 percent of respondents had heard of Pora, and virtually none wanted to join it.

Nearly 19 percent of young Russians either definitely or probably would vote for Stalin.

Given the lack of interest among Russian youth, what is behind the Kremlin's fear of Orange? These findings suggest either that the Kremlin has truly bad information about the revolutionary potential of Russia's youth, as it did about Ukraine's, or, knowing full well that a revolution is highly improbable, Kremlin insiders cynically stir up Orange hysteria in order to keep Putin in, the popu-

lation down, and the Western donors out. Regardless, Moscow's efforts to exaggerate the threat of supposed enemies of the state recall similar tactics used by Soviet leaders to ensure their grip on power. In fact, what struck us most about the recent data was how young Russians view this Soviet past, how they (mis)understand Stalin, how they view democracy and authoritarian rule, and where they see themselves in the world.

STALIN: 'MORE GOOD THAN BAD'


In the June 2005 survey, we dedicated an entire battery of questions to exploring young Russians' views on Stalin. We found tremendous ambivalence and widespread misperception. When asked, "If Stalin were running for president today, would you vote for him?" the survey results suggest that nearly 19 percent of young Russians either definitely or probably would. An additional 20 percent would probably not vote for him. The adverb is significant: it would be very worrisome if nearly 20 percent of young German adults said they would probably not, rather than definitely not, vote for Hitler if he were running for president today. Only slightly more than half of the respondents unambiguously reject the possibility of voting for Stalin who, according to the well-established historical record, killed, tortured, enslaved, and imprisoned millions of his country's citizens.

This single measure of views about Stalin—hypothetical proclivity to vote for him—may be misleading. We therefore included several other questions in the 2005 survey to examine different aspects of attitudes toward Stalin. We asked respondents whether they agree or disagree with six statements about him, three positive and three negative. The responses to

these questions indicated that the attitudes of Russia's youth are neither straightforward nor uniform. About half (51 percent) agreed that Stalin was a wise leader, while 39 percent disagreed. A majority (61 percent) thought Stalin should receive credit for victory in World War II; only 28 percent thought he should not. Similarly, 56 percent thought that he did more good than bad, and only one-third disagreed. Opinion is about equally divided over whether he was a cruel tyrant: 43 percent agreed, and 47 percent disagreed. On one hand, 70 percent concurred that he imprisoned, tortured, and killed millions of innocent people. Yet, about 40 percent agreed with the statement that people today tend to exaggerate Stalin's role in the terror. We aggregated the responses to these six questions and present them as a scale from 1 to 5, with higher values denoting pro-Stalin views, as depicted in figure 1.⁵

The survey data suggest there are roughly as many strong pro-Stalinists as there are strong anti-Stalinists among Russians under 30, but opinions are not polarized. Instead, they are distributed like a bell curve, with about three-quarters holding ambivalent views toward Stalin. Clearly, the data reveal that young Russians have by no means come to a consensus that Stalin is a negative figure in Russian history. Only 14 percent might be said to have reached that conclusion (those with a score of 2 or lower on the 5-point scale), while about 12 percent took the opposite view entirely (combining those with a score of 4 or higher). The question is, are these views of Stalin representative of larger societal trends?⁶

Figure 1
Distribution on Pro-Stalin Scale
 (Source: Survey of Russian youth, July 2005)



DEMOCRACY AND AUTHORITARIANISM

We also found young Russians divided about whether democracy or authoritarian forms of government were preferable. In 2002–2004, we asked more than 16,500 survey respondents ages 16–64 a question that appears on surveys around the world. Respondents were given three statements and asked which they agreed with most: “Democracy is always preferable,” “Authoritarian government is sometimes preferable to democracy,” or “The form of government does not matter to people like me.” Our results suggest that 34 percent of Russians always prefer democracy, and 33 percent prefer authoritarian rule some of the time; the remaining 33 percent either say it does not matter or decline to answer. In these same surveys, support for democracy is stronger, although far from universal, among the youngest cohort. About 40 percent of 16–29-year-olds always prefer democracy, 29 percent sometimes

prefer authoritarian rule, and 31 percent are indifferent or decline to answer.⁷

If anything, support for authoritarianism may be growing among Russia’s youth.

The 2005 youth survey suggests that nearly identical proportions of young Russians always prefer democracy (37 percent) and sometimes prefer authoritarianism (36 percent). Only 8 percent found it difficult to say, compared to 16 percent in the earlier surveys. The number of those who say it does not matter rose to 19 percent, from 15 percent, indicating a more considered indifference among youth.

More generally, the data show that opinion

about whether democracy is always desirable remains sharply divided among Russian youth. If anything, support for authoritarianism may be growing.

Comments made in the focus groups suggest that this question does not fully capture the confusion underlying young Russians’ understandings of democracy. In one focus group with self-identified supporters of democracy, a participant declared that “history shows that authoritarian, and more importantly totalitarian, regimes in some cases are justified.” Another agreed that “totalitarian or authoritarian regimes can be good only in one case, when it is headed by a sensible person.” Yet a third added, “I too am, in principle, pro-democracy, but as [other participants] said, under the fist of a harsh leader, we feel ourselves at peace.”⁸ At least some of those who believe they are supportive of democracy retain fairly positive and conflicting views of authoritarian rule, suggesting that the number of hard-core democrats is much smaller than one-third of respondents.


Other survey results confirm the weak, ambivalent commitment to democracy among Russia’s youth. To understand the relative coherence of

respondent's views on democracy and authoritarianism better, we asked, "What form of government is best for Russia today" and added three questions exploring attitudes about the relative advantages of democratic rule and three questions about the advantages of authoritarian rule. Only 22 percent said that the best form of government for Russia today would be a pure democracy; 40 percent believed the ideal government should be democratic but should also retain some elements of authoritarianism. Twenty-six percent would prefer either complete or mostly authoritarian rule. When it comes to the relative strengths and weaknesses of democracy, 74 percent agreed fully or at least somewhat that democracy does a better job protecting people's rights to express themselves, but only 32 percent disagree that democracy makes it easier for the rich to exploit the poor, and 43 percent say democracy limits the abuse of power. We performed a similar analysis of the questions pertaining to authoritarian government, finding that 60 percent agreed that authoritarian rule provides more order, 48 percent disagreed that it fuels more corruption, and 43 percent agreed that it creates better conditions for economic growth.

Figure 2 presents two scales: one consists of the number of pro-democracy responses on five questions discussed above explicitly related to democracy, and the other provides the number of pro-authoritarian responses to five questions. In contrast to the one-third that responded "democracy is always preferable," only about 12 percent can be classified as having "strongly pro-democratic" views, for example, choosing at least four out of five pro-democratic responses. Summing up the pro-authoritarian responses, 7 per-

Figure 2
Pro-democracy and Pro-authoritarianism Scales

(Source: Survey of Russian youth, July 2005)




cent chose the pro-authoritarian position on all five questions, and 14 percent chose them on four out of five. Accordingly, 21 percent of the sample can be classified as “strong authoritarians.” Overall, Russian youths seem to have divided preferences between democracy and authoritarianism as well as a poor understanding of the relative economic and political consequences of these forms of governance.

RUSSIA’S PLACE IN THE WORLD

As a third measure of young Russians’ attitudes beyond their opinions of Stalin or preferences for democracy over authoritarianism, we assess how they view Russia in relation to the world. How nationalist or internationalist are they? Answers to six questions aggregated and presented in figure 3 revealed two separate dimensions of views, one pertaining to whether Russia should pursue a distinct path and one to suspicions about foreign influences. Answers were generally consistent with other findings: young respondents are divided on both issues. Sixty-two percent agreed that young people in Russia want the same things as young people in western Europe, but a majority (54 percent) did not agree that Russia should try to become like other European countries. Seventy-one percent disagreed that Russia should apologize for the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states. In fact only 9 percent agreed that such an apology, which would bring Russia’s understanding of that period in line with that of the West, would be appropriate. Fifty-nine percent said foreigners who assist Russian organizations financially are try-

Figure 3
Scales Measuring Views on Nationalism Issues

(Source: Survey of Russian youth, July 2005)



ing to meddle in Russia's domestic affairs, and 72 percent agreed that Russia would be better off if foreigners stopped imposing their ideas. Substantially fewer, but still a surprisingly large number (28 percent), agreed with the idea that foreigners introduced AIDS into Russia in order to weaken the country.

Both measures in figure 3 suggest that the most typical views are just to the right of the midpoint, and the overall weight of the opinions tilts toward more nationalist sentiments. Strong nationalists (average of 4 or higher) constituted 27 percent, both with respect to Russia's distinctiveness and to suspicions of foreign influence. Strong antinationalists constituted, respectively, only 8 percent and 13 percent. Young Russians show a clear if somewhat moderate tendency to lean toward more nationalist views.

Retargeting Foreign Assistance

Given our findings on widespread ambivalence among young Russians regarding Stalin, misunderstandings of democracy, and inclinations toward nationalism, the donor community should pursue a radically different approach to democracy and human rights work in Russia than that which it has used since the early 1990s. Today, the foreign assistance community working in Russia should begin to address habits, practices, cultures, and mentalities, all of which can be transformed, as the history of racist and sexist ideas in the United States attests, if they are acknowledged and encouraged to change rather than ignored or condoned. Despite the steady creep toward authoritarian rule in Russia, most Western donors—government sources and private foundations—continue to focus on support for political parties, independent media, and the rule of law, even though these sectors have weakened over the last 10 years.

With an almost obsessive preoccupation with outcomes (e.g., how many nongovernmental organizations exist?), some donors have unwittingly enabled activists to perpetuate organizational practices that undermine the objective of cultivating a human rights culture. We have observed that activists have difficulty setting goals, planning strategically, and communicating effectively, skills used around the world in successful campaigns.⁹ Some donors nurture displays of "authenticity," wherein activists are rewarded mainly for articulating their commitment for human rights but not for building public support. Assistance has thus inhibited efforts to engage a broader base of citizens to remedy Russia's many challenges.

Others involved in assistance recognize that the amounts allocated are insufficient and strategies deployed inappropriate given the situation in Russia today. Even though a little-publicized but serious and sustained effort in-

side the Bush administration to pull the plug altogether on assistance to democracy and human rights promotion in Russia in 2002 and 2003 failed, existing funds have never been adequate or strategically deployed.¹⁰ The stunningly cynical argument for ending assistance made by the White House's Office of Management and Budget was that Russia should be graduated from assistance because of progress made toward democracy. The Kremlin's own actions in 2004, such as eliminating the direct vote for governors as an incomprehensible response to the tragic massacre at the school in Beslan as well as the kangaroo court overseeing the trial against former Yukos head Mikhael Khodorkovsky, closed off that option.

The demand and desire for democracy and human rights, as is the case everywhere, must come from within the Russian population. Although the Russian Nelson Mandela or Aung San Suu Kyi has yet to emerge, over the last several years we have worked with some extraordinary, brave, young human rights activists who have made clear the enormous difference that support from Western donors can make in their efforts. The best strategy would focus resources mainly on this younger generation. Today, the older generation greatly dominates most human rights and pro-democracy organizations, and the participation and capacity of the younger generation remain extremely limited. Western donors should recognize this tendency and the danger this demographic situation poses to the long-term prospects of civil society development. Rather than exclusively rewarding members of the oldest generation of activists, they should make special efforts to nurture and bolster this next generation.

The challenge of finding and supporting young human rights activists, especially given the conflicted perception that many young Russians have of their place in the world, is daunting. The survey data suggest Russian youth are uncertain if they want to be part of what has become a global struggle for justice and democracy. Yet, the data also show that young Russians are not uniformly authoritarian. They hold diverse views and exhibit deep ambivalence about their identity. This decidedly confused set of attitudes underscores the critical nature of supporting young human rights defenders.

In addition to focusing on the younger generation, the donor community needs to address the role the past currently plays in social and political development. Among the many mistakes characterizing democracy assistance in the 1990s was the assumption that the past could be quickly forgotten or overcome. Yet, the economic hardships of the 1990s coupled with Russia's unfinished reconciliation with its past—a history in which millions were deported, countries occupied, slave labor institutionalized, secret police mobilized, and tens of millions disappeared—have been fertile ground for Soviet and even Stalinist nostalgia. Our survey data document with quantitative evidence what others have anecdotally recorded. Nearly every page of Peter

Baker and Susan Glasser's recent book, *Kremlin Rising*, contains some relevant vignette illustrating the theme of Soviet and Stalinist nostalgia, on topics ranging from the war in Chechnya to the takeover of independent media to the rise of Putin's KGB cronies to positions of power.¹¹

In this context, "success stories" about the impact of foreign assistance on institutional developments in Russia, the staple of U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) officials' congressional testimony, seem at best out of touch and at worst disingenuous. The younger generation of Russians expresses surprising levels of approval for Stalin, and donors should directly confront this reality. Yet, despite Stalin's lingering popularity, no evidence supports the argument that Russians are genetically predisposed to be authoritarians any more than Americans are born democrats. Young Russians, similar to youth in many countries, must be encouraged to come to grips with the legacies of the past. Thankfully, our survey results suggest a sizable portion (51 percent) believe "we need to know more about Stalin's period so that we don't repeat mistakes of the past."

As in many other countries that have experienced widespread repression, such as Argentina, South Africa, or Serbia, misunderstandings of the past distort the development of a human rights culture. Recent work by political scientist James L. Gibson finds that systematic efforts in South Africa to address crimes of the past have had a positive impact on reconciliation and have played a critical role in advancing a human rights culture in that country.¹² In contrast, Serbia is held back by the neuralgia concerning the death and destruction wrought by Slobodan Milosevic. Until the release of a video in June 2005 capturing crimes committed by Serb forces against Muslims in shocking detail, more than 50 percent of Serbs did not believe a massacre had occurred at Srebrenica a decade earlier.¹³

Ultimately, the business of de-Stalinization will be up to Russians. Outsiders, however, can help in important ways. In addition to funding organizations, they can provide state-of-the-art historical materials and help develop awareness campaigns that make it cool for Russia's youth to learn about the past. Hollywood could even be enlisted. Steven Spielberg, if he collaborated with a Russian film giant, would find a ready audience for a movie addressing Stalin's Russia, a sort of *Schindler's List* about the gulag. These are meant as suggestions rather than as a checklist. A serious community-wide effort will be required to flesh out specific tactics taken to support this shift in strategy.

Donors should now pursue a different approach to human rights work in Russia.

The democracy promotion community in Washington, including organizations such as Freedom House, the National Endowment for Democracy, Internews, the National Democratic Institute, and the International Republican Institute, as well as organizations abroad such as the British Westminster Fund and the German Stiftung Institutions, all have a stake in de-Stalinization, whether they promote the rule of law or free and fair elections, support civil society or public health, combat corruption, work with journalists, or engage in awareness campaigns on police or army abuse. Soviet-era attitudes and practices penetrate all of contemporary Russian society, from the passive citizenry accepting the dominant view of the leader rather than exercising individual initiative and personal responsibility to the appeal of myth and emotion rather than the primacy of reason, fact, and evidence and from an acceptance of corruption rather than a demand for accountability and transparency to the tolerance of xenophobia instead of multiculturalism.

Perhaps because of the enormity of the challenge and because it requires such a dramatic shift in the modality of and the main approach to democracy assistance, there will undoubtedly be resistance within the donor community. The Putin administration, however, may pose the ultimate obstacle. Obviously, the Russian government should lead the way in de-Stalinization rather than encourage a positive view of Stalin. Unfortunately, in May 2005 senior Bush administration officials failed to convince Putin to denounce Stalin's pact with Hitler that divided Europe, the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of 1939. Putin's irritated refusal to address this dramatic event sent a distressing signal both to Russia's neighbors, who will never forget their sacrifices at the expense of Stalin's actions, and to Russia's next generation, who are already confused about what to think.

From Institutions to Ideas

The next G-8 summit will be held in St. Petersburg in July 2006. Yet, every day Russia feels less like an industrialized democracy and more like a corporatist autocracy in danger of being left behind in the twenty-first century. Russians view their own public institutions as deeply dysfunctional. The police do more to undermine than preserve public safety. The once-proud army has been embarrassed by its failures in Chechnya as well as endless reports about the violent abuse and exploitation of its own recruits by more senior soldiers and officers. The deteriorating health care system must share the blame for Russia's well-documented demographic disaster. The population is shrinking from a toxic combination of infectious diseases and ailments that have long been addressed in Western states through preventive medicine or treatment.

The political system also shows signs of morbidity. Putin has presided over a spectacular and rapid shrinking of political space, bringing the legislative and judicial branches of the federal government, regional authorities, and national television under Kremlin control. The government's policies in the North Caucasus have demonstrably failed. The decade-long conflict in Chechnya, which has not been contained, as the world witnessed with the October 2002 siege of a theater in downtown Moscow and the September 2004 massacre in the Beslan school, continues to undermine Russia's security. The entire region appears on the verge of a full-scale ethnic conflagration, fueled by inept and corrupt Kremlin-installed authorities.

Western donors, especially in the time leading up to next year's G-8 summit, should be thinking about what they can do to help develop a culture in Russia that supports democracy and human rights. Even though Russians do not support democracy assistance for political parties, our survey results suggest young people are neutral or even positive about support to improve human rights. Coming to terms with the crimes of the Stalinist past would fit well in the latter category. A human rights culture cannot flourish in Russia as long as Stalin's legacies persist. Because the younger generation of Russians might be inspired to challenge these conceptions, a campaign to reach them is important and timely.

Given the limitations within Putin's Russia, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of democracy assistance. Yet, if donors do not change their strategies and tactics, such assistance will have no impact at all. The recommendations here, literally to forget "colored revolutions," at least for the time being, and focus on addressing ideas that might serve democracy's foundation, may strike some as controversial. Yet, the views presented by survey respondents make the case for addressing the enduring legacies of the Stalin revolution before an even larger percentage of young Russians believe Stalin did more good than bad and historical revisionism takes over completely.

A human rights culture cannot flourish in Russia as long as Stalin's legacies persist.

Notes

1. "Putin Opposes Foreign Financing of Political Activities in Russia," Mosnews.com, July 20, 2005.
2. Sarah E. Mendelson and John K. Glenn, eds., *The Power and Limits of NGOs: A Critical Look at Building Democracy in Eastern Europe and Eurasia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).

3. On the “political consequences of absent memory,” see Anne Applebaum, *The Gulag: A History* (New York: Doubleday, 2003), p. 572.
4. The 2005 survey was supported by grants from the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation and by the Glaser Progress Foundation and was written in collaboration with the Russian human rights organizations Memorial as part of an ongoing project.
5. We verified that these items could be combined into a scale using exploratory factor analysis. To create the scale, we assigned integer values to the responses and took the average across all six items. For more details on this and the other scales in this article, contact Theodore Gerber.
6. For a more detailed exploration of the Stalin questions on this survey by the authors, see Sarah E. Mendelson and Theodore P. Gerber, “Failing the Stalin Test,” *Foreign Affairs* (forthcoming January/February 2006).
7. In April–May 2002, we conducted two sets of surveys supported by a grant from the Glaser Progress Foundation. In January–February 2003, we conducted surveys with support from the U.S. Department of State. In June 2004, USAID supported a survey conducted in six regions as part of our work with Memorial, and the Ford Foundation supported a survey in July 2004 that was nationally representative of the general population.
8. The focus groups were conducted by a native Russian speaker and observed by the authors behind a two-way mirror. They were also taped and transcribed.
9. For descriptions of the work with Russian activists, see <http://www.csis.org/ruseura/humanrights/campaign.htm>.
10. “Potemkin Democracy,” *Washington Post*, May 30, 2003, p. A22 (editorial); Igor Semenenko, “U.S. Rolling Back Funding for Muskie Programs,” *Moscow Times*, August 26, 2003, p. 10.
11. Peter Baker and Susan Glasser, *Kremlin Rising: Vladimir Putin’s Russia and the End of Revolution* (New York: Scribner, 2005). Also, see Nina Khrushcheva, “‘Rehabilitating’ Stalin,” *World Policy Journal* 22, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 67–73.
12. James L. Gibson, *Overcoming Apartheid: Can Truth Reconcile a Divided Nation?* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2004).
13. Courtney Angela Brkic, “The Wages of Denial,” *New York Times*, July 11, 2005, p. A17.