Do Data Breach Disclosure Laws Reduce Identity Theft?

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Abstract

In the United States, identity theft resulted in corporate and consumer losses of $56 billion dollars in 2005, with up to 35 percent of known identity thefts caused by corporate data breaches. Many states have responded by adopting data breach disclosure laws that require firms to notify consumers if their personal information has been lost or stolen. Although the laws are expected to reduce identity theft, their effect has yet to be empirically measured. We use panel data from the U.S. Federal Trade Commission to estimate the impact of data breach disclosure laws on identity theft from 2002 to 2009. We find that adoption of data breach disclosure laws reduce identity theft caused by data breaches, on average, by 6.1 percent.

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INTRODUCTION

Data breaches occur when personally identifiable information such as names, Social Security numbers, and credit card numbers are accidentally lost or maliciously stolen. These breaches can result in hundreds of thousands (sometimes millions) of compromised records and lead to identity theft and related crimes (Givens, 2000). In the United States, identity theft resulted in corporate and consumer losses of around $56 billion in 2005 (Javelin Research, 2006). In an effort to reduce these crimes, many states have responded by adopting data breach disclosure (also known as security breach notification) laws, requiring firms to notify individuals when their personal information has been compromised. However, to date, no empirical analysis has investigated the effectiveness of such legislative initiatives in reducing identity theft. In this paper, we use panel data gathered from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and other sources over eight years to empirically examine this effect.

The Goals of Data Breach Disclosure Laws

In response to the recent publicity surrounding data breaches, much time and effort have been devoted to preventing breaches and helping consumers avoid, or

1 Criminals use stolen personal information in many ways. For example, they can incur fraudulent charges on existing accounts, or apply for new utilities (phone, electrical, television, Internet) and financial accounts (such as credit cards, mortgages, and loans).

2 This value was calculated as the estimated number of identity theft victims in 2005 multiplied by the average amount stolen per victim: 8.9 million victims*$6,383 stolen/victim = $56.6 billion. (Actual amount lost per consumer was $422 on average.)
mitigate, any resulting harm. At least four U.S. congressional hearings have convened to discuss how data breach disclosure laws may reduce identity theft (Identity Theft, 2005; Data Breaches, 2005; Securing Personal Data, 2005; Securing Consumers’ Data, 2005). In testimony to the U.S. Senate, the chairman of the FTC testified, “[t]he Commission believes that if a security breach creates a significant risk of identity theft or other related harm, affected consumers should be notified. Prompt notification to consumers in these cases can help them mitigate the damage caused by identity theft” (Data Breaches, 2005, p. 10). Moreover, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) has stated that “notification to the individuals affected . . . has clear benefits, allowing people the opportunity to take steps to protect themselves against the dangers of identity theft” (GAO, 2006). The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has proposed new security and privacy guidelines, including “requirements for notices to individuals . . . intended to give investors information that would help them protect themselves against identity theft” (SEC, 2008). Countries other than the United States have also argued in favor of breach disclosures. For example, the U.K. Science and Technology Committee has claimed that “data security breach notification law would be among the most important advances that the United Kingdom could make in promoting personal internet security” (Personal Internet Security, 2007).

As of December 31, 2009, 45 U.S. states had adopted such data breach disclosure laws (see Figure 1). Many of these laws explicitly addressed identity theft prevention. For example, California’s law was intended “to help consumers protect their financial security by requiring that state agencies and businesses . . . quickly disclose to consumers any breach of the security of the system, if the information disclosed could be used to commit identity theft” (Saskia, 2002, p. 3). Further, Senator Simitian (CA), who co-wrote California’s data breach notification law, noted that the purpose of the bill was to “provide assurance that when consumers are at risk because of an unauthorized acquisition of personal information, the consumer will know that he is vulnerable, and will thus be equipped to protect himself physically and/or financially” and, moreover, to “provide an incentive to those responsible for public and privacy databases to improve their security” (Simitian, 2009a, p. 1015). The Hawaiian law is even more direct: “The purpose of this Act is to alleviate the growing plague of identity theft by requiring businesses and government agencies that maintain records containing resident individuals’ personal information to notify an individual whenever the individual’s personal information has been compromised by unauthorized disclosure” (S.B. 2290, 2006, p. 1). Montana’s breach law is “an act adopting and revising laws to implement individual privacy and to prevent identity theft” (H.B. 732, 2005, p. 1).

Requirements under Data Breach Disclosure Laws

Details of the legislation vary across states, but their central themes are consistent: The laws require that companies notify individuals when their personal information has been lost or stolen. Specifically, the laws require notification (1) in a timely manner (2) if personally identifiable information has either been lost, or is likely to be acquired, by an unauthorized person, (3) and is reasonably considered to compromise an individual’s personal information. A breach is defined as the “unauthorized acquisition of computerized data that compromises the security, confidentiality, or integrity of personal information maintained by the person or business” (California Civil Code, 2000, § 1798.82). Personal information generally refers to an

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3 For the purpose of this paper, we are not including the District of Columbia, nor city-specific breach laws such as in New York City. We are also not considering federal sectoral legislation such as the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act (GLBA), as their effects are not identifiable with our econometric model.
Figure 1. Adoption of Breach Notification Laws by State from 2002 to 2009.
individual's name in addition to another piece of identifiable information such as driver's license, passport, or credit card number.

One differentiator among the state laws is the trigger, or threshold, at which notification must be made. Twenty-five state laws require notification when the personal information is reasonably assumed to have been acquired by an unauthorized party, whereas other state laws require notification only if it is reasonable to believe the information will cause harm to consumers. The consequences of not complying include retribution by the state attorney general or a civil right of action (the ability for affected consumers to bring a lawsuit). Many states do not specify a maximum civil penalty. However, the Arizona and Arkansas laws allow a civil penalty not exceeding $10,000, whereas the limit is $25,000 in Connecticut and Idaho, and $500,000 in Florida.

A characteristic of these laws is that the residency of the consumer, rather than the location of the breach, drives disclosure. Therefore, a firm that incurs a data breach must comply with the state laws of each of their affected consumers. For example, if a retail firm based in Oregon suffers a breach that includes personal information of residents from California, the firm must notify those California residents. Of course, not all breaches affect consumers in every state. Breaches in state government agencies (e.g., DMVs), community colleges, schools, and hospitals usually affect only residents of a single state. Even breaches by national firms (e.g., chain stores) may only compromise individuals (often employees) in a single state.

The Debate over the Impact of Data Breach Disclosure Laws

The rationales for these laws are contained within two phrases: “sunlight as a disinfectant” and “right to know.” First, notification can “transform [private] information about firm practices into publicly known information as well as alter practices within the firm” (Schwartz & Janger, 2007). Hence, by highlighting a firm’s poor security measures, legislators hope to create an incentive for all firms (even those that have not been breached) to improve the protection of their data, thereby “disinfecting” themselves of shoddy security practices (Ranger, 2007). This, in turn, is expected to reduce the probability of breaches and resulting harm (including identity theft). In other words, because it has been shown that consumers lose confidence in firms that suffer breaches (Ponemon Institute, 2005), proponents believe that the laws will force firms to internalize more of the cost of a breach through notification letters, customer support call centers, and mitigating actions such as marketing campaigns and free credit monitoring.

Second, this form of light-handed paternalism often represents a preferred approach to legislative enforcement compared with a “command and control” regime (Magat & Viscusi, 1992). Consumers feel that they have the right to be informed when firms use or abuse their information. Having been notified of a breach of their personal information, consumers could then make informed decisions and take appropriate actions to prevent or mitigate the impact of identity theft. For example, to lessen their risks, consumers who have been notified of a breach may alert their bank, their credit card merchant, the FTC, or law enforcement; they may close unused financial accounts; they may place a credit freeze or fraud alert on their credit report. Notifications can also enable law enforcement, researchers, and policymakers to better understand which firms and business sectors

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5 A fraud alert informs potential creditors that a consumer may have been a victim of identity theft. The creditor must then take additional measures to verify the identity of the consumer. A credit freeze prevents a creditor from checking a consumer’s credit report or opening new accounts.
are better (or worse) at protecting consumer and employee data. However, it may only be through legislation that firms acquire sufficient incentive to actually improve their practices to reduce the likelihood of future breaches and restore consumer confidence.

Arguments in favor of such disclosure laws are compelling. However, scholars have debated whether a data breach disclosure regime would, in fact, increase social welfare. Although it may improve a firm’s security practices, and help some consumers mitigate the risk of identity theft, on balance, it may only serve to burden them. First, firms must comply with multiple, disparate, and perhaps conflicting state laws. Next, if the probability of suffering identity theft following a data breach is, in fact, very low, then costs incurred as a result of the laws would be unwarranted: Firms would be forced to notify consumers without benefit, and consumers would be needlessly freezing and “thawing” their credit reports (Data Breaches, 2005, p. 10; GAO, 2007). Cate (2009) posits that “if we think breaches really cause harm, then notices are too little. We’re just shifting the burden to somebody else. If we think breaches do not cause harm... then notices are an unnecessary cost.” Cate (2005) also argues the consumers may become desensitized if they receive too many notices. Moreover, Lenard and Rubin (2005, 2006) argue that these laws are unnecessary for a number of reasons: They may impede e-commerce and stifle technological development by discouraging firms from innovating using consumers’ personal information (or stop collecting it altogether); the externality caused by data breaches is not so great, as most of the cost of identity theft and fraud is already borne by the firms (businesses, banks, credit card issuers, merchants); firms can instead use self-regulated notifications as a market differentiator, and if notifications are sufficiently valued by the consumer, the market will react accordingly.

In summary, these arguments present a stimulating debate as to whether data breach disclosure laws can reduce identity theft—an impact that, to our knowledge, no one has attempted to empirically measure. The purpose of this study is to investigate the effectiveness of data breach disclosure laws in reducing identity theft. Because of the compelling controversy surrounding the connection between adoption of these laws and identity theft, we hope to offer a relevant and timely contribution to the policy debate. In order to properly identify this effect, we attempt to control for a number of possible factors, such as endogeneity and what we call “awareness bias.” That is, we consider that increased media attention regarding data breaches and the risk of identity theft may affect reported, rather than actual, crimes, making proper identification difficult. Conceivably, news reports, and their recommendation to report any crimes, may cause consumers to be both reactive (inducing them to report their victimization to law enforcement and the Federal Trade Commission) and proactive (causing them to detect their victimization when previously they were unaware). We address both endogeneity and awareness bias later in the manuscript. Using panel data on identity theft gathered from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and other sources from 2002 to 2009, we use state and time fixed effect regression analysis to empirically estimate the impact of data breach disclosure laws on the frequency of identity thefts due to breaches. We find that adoption of these disclosure laws reduces identity thefts, on average, by 6.1 percent.

The next section in this paper provides background literature related to information economics and disclosure policies. The paper then presents the conceptual model behind our empirical approach and the results of the data analysis. A discussion of the policy implications of our findings completes the manuscript.

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6 As estimated by Javelin Research in 2003 (90.5 percent), 2005 (89.6 percent), and 2006 (93.7 percent).
RELATED WORK

Our paper draws from the literature on disclosure policies, the literature on information security economics, and the literature in criminology.

Information Economics and Disclosure Policies

Many researchers have studied the effects of disclosure on market outcomes. For instance, Jin and Leslie (2003) investigated health information disclosure in the restaurant industry and found that disclosing the hygiene quality of a restaurant increases health inspection scores and lowers the occurrence of food-borne diseases. Moreover, disclosure becomes a credible signal to consumers, who respond by demanding cleaner restaurants. Mathios (2000) examined the effects of mandatory disclosure of food nutrition labels on salad dressing sales in a chain of New York grocery stores. He found that producers of salad dressings with the highest fat content suffer a greater decline in market share once forced to disclose nutrition information, relative to less fatty dressings. These studies provide some evidence of how information disclosure policies can affect firm behavior and improve market outcomes. (A lengthy discussion of many disclosure policies related to health care, auto safety, public education, and more can be found in Fung, Graham, and Weil, 2007.)

A number of studies have examined the financial impacts to firms that disclose a privacy or security breach. Campbell et al. (2003) find a significant and negative effect on the stock price of the breached company, but only for data breaches caused by "unauthorized access to confidential information" (p. 1). Cavusoglu, Mishra, and Raghunathan (2004) find that the disclosure of a security breach results in the loss of $2.1 of a firm's market valuation. Telang and Wattal (2007) find that software vendors’ stock prices suffer when information about their products' vulnerability is announced. Acquisti, Friedman, and Telang (2006) use an event study to investigate the impact on stock market prices for firms that incur a privacy breach and find a negative and significant, but short-lived, reduction of 0.6 percent on the day when the breach is disclosed. Ko and Dorantes (2006) study the four financial quarters following a security breach and find that, although breached firms’ overall performances were lower (relative to firms that incurred no breach), their sales increased significantly (again, relative to firms that incurred no breach). Despite the absence of more conclusive empirical findings on the effect of publicly disclosed data breaches, firms nevertheless appear to be making security and operational investments in the wake of disclosure laws (Samuelson Law Clinic, 2007).

Criminology and Victim Precaution Policies

Estimating the effect of a policy intervention (e.g., a law) on crime is a familiar research question in criminology. To be clear, the policies identified in this manuscript (data breach disclosure laws) are meant to influence safety and protection measures by both firms and potential victims of a crime (identity theft), rather than criminal behavior. There is some literature on the direct effect of individual crime prevention (Cook, 1986; Shavell, 1991; Kobayashi, 2005), but our work contributes to the more limited body of research that examines the effect of a policy intervention on victims’ precautions. For example, Ayers and Levitt (1998) examine the effect of state adoption of the lojack (an unobservable vehicle theft recovery device) on auto thefts and the positive externalities caused by its adoption. Also, Cook and MacDonald (2010) examine the effect of implementing business improvement districts (BIDs: taxing local business owners to provide, among other services, public safety) on local crime reduction.

Moreover, for the purpose of this study, we gain valuable methodological insight from the overall approaches of criminology and policy evaluation. For example,
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The primary objective of data breach disclosure laws is to force firms to notify consumers when their personal information has been lost or stolen. The law is also expected to act as “sunlight as a disinfectant.” Therefore, we can expect two effects from these laws: increasing consumer precaution and increasing firm precaution in avoiding breaches.

Consumer precaution should increase after the passage of the law because, as more consumers are notified of a breach involving their sensitive information, they may take steps to reduce the risk and the costs of becoming a victim of identity theft. For example, they could notify their financial institutions to block transactions and cancel accounts or apply credit freezes and fraud alerts. Moreover, such notices also could serve to increase consumer awareness in general, making them alert to possible identity thefts. Therefore, a primary effect of data breach disclosure laws should be the reduction of the incident of identity theft, as well as a mitigation of its impact, via better consumer precaution.

On the other hand, firm investment in security and protection of sensitive data should increase, as firms try to avoid the (larger) tangible and intangible costs associated with notifying consumers after a data breach. The tangible costs include replacement costs of credit cards (through bank negotiations), proving free credit counseling, setting up 1-800 numbers, and so on. The intangible costs can be also significant—for instance, those associated with negative reputation effects. Acquisti, Friedman, and Telang (2006) show that repeated disclosure of data breaches and newspaper headlines could lead to a significant reputation impact and loss in share price. The Ponemon Institute (2005) suggests that consumers lose confidence in firms that suffer breaches. Therefore, another effect of the laws would be to induce firms to invest and improve their security controls—in order to avoid a data breach and avoid the direct and indirect costs associated with notification. In turn, these investments may reduce the number of data breaches, thereby reducing the number of identity theft crimes due to breaches.

In sum, both these effects (consumers taking precautions and firms investing in better security) should reduce the incidence of identity theft.

In order to qualify the overall effect of data breach disclosure laws, however, it is important to note that identity theft originates from different sources. Disclosure laws would reduce identity thefts for situations where consumer data is controlled by firms, but they are not likely to significantly reduce identity thefts due to, say, stolen mail or garbage. In a randomized phone survey conducted by Synovate...
(FTC, 2007b), 12 percent of identity thefts occurred as a result of interaction with firms, while another 56 percent of victims did not know the cause. In another survey conducted by Javelin Research (2006, p. 7), 35 percent of identity fraud was a result of information that was within the control of businesses.8 Finally, in 2007, researchers at the Center for Identity Management and Information Protection (CIMIP) at Utica College studied 517 identity theft cases from the U.S. Secret Service (Gordon et al., 2007). For cases where the source could be determined (about half of the total 517), 26.5 percent originated from firms.

The Impact of Disclosure Laws on Breaches

Naturally, even prior to their impact on identity theft, a first-order effect of the laws should be to reduce the number of breaches. However, we note that the number of reported breaches is endogenously affected by the law as well: Only after the laws are passed are firms forced to disclose and their breaches enter the statistics. This may create the false impression that breaches increase following the enactment of the laws. In other words, analyzing the number of breaches directly is unlikely to provide useful results. As expected, Figure 2 shows that the number of reported breaches has increased over time.

Identity Theft Data

The most comprehensive public sources for identity theft data are the consumer reports published by the FTC since 2002. The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998 led the FTC to establish the Identity Theft Data Clearinghouse in November 1999 to collect identity theft complaints from victims.9 Consumer Sentinel is the Web portal by which annual identity theft reports are made available to the public and where law enforcement can further mine the data.

For our analysis, we used consumer-reported identity thefts collected from the FTC for each state from the years 2002 to 2009. Note that these reports are generated by individual consumers (once they discover the theft), rather than as an automated check and balance by other agencies such as consumer credit bureaus. Because only annual data are published, we invoked the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to request monthly data. In our analysis, we aggregated the monthly data to six-month periods (two per year) for the years 2002 to 2009 (producing 800 observations).

One of the advantages of this data source is the consistency of data collection methodologies across states (without which our estimations could be erroneous).10 On the other hand, the data is self-reported by victims—a familiar issue for criminologists, who often rely on various forms of self-reported crime data (e.g., Uniform Crime Reports and National Crime Victimization Surveys). The frequent underreporting of crimes is often referred to as the “dark figure” (Biderman & Reiss, 1967) and represents a potential source of error. However, not only is the FTC (to our knowledge) the only source for cross-sectional (cross-state) time series identity theft data, but, more importantly, trends in FTC time series identity theft data are consistent with other surveys by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (Baum, 2006, 2007), Synovate (FTC, 2003, 2007b), and Javelin Research (2006, 2007).

8 The categories controlled by the firm are: taken by a corrupt business employee, 15 percent; some other way, 7 percent; misuse of data from an in-store/onsite/mail/telephone transaction, 7 percent; stolen from a company that handles financial data, 6 percent.


10 For instance, underreporting would be problematic if the reporting patterns changed suddenly over time across states. If the reporting levels change uniformly across all states—which is likely the case with FTC data—these effects would be captured by our time dummies.
Summary statistics for total annual reported identity thefts based on the data we obtained through the FOIA request are shown in Table 1. In 2009, for example, California had the highest reported identity theft, over 42,000 (total), while North Dakota had the lowest, at 192.

Figure 3 shows that total identity theft reports increasing at a decreasing rate from 2002 until 2005, after which they decline slightly in 2006 and increase again until 2009. Prior to 2005, only California had adopted the law, with others following in 2005 ($n = 8$), 2006 ($n = 19$), 2007 ($n = 8$), 2008 ($n = 6$), and 2009 ($n = 3$).

Figure 3 shows the relative changes in reported identity theft rates for three groups: those that adopted in 2005 and 2006 and the five states that, as of the end of 2009, had not adopted the law. By comparison, murder rates are around 5 to 6, robberies are 150, and motor vehicle thefts are around 400 per 100,000.

Reported identity thefts for states that adopted the law in 2005 seem slightly greater than others, and in states that had not adopted any law (as of December 31, 2009), they seem slightly lower than others. States that adopted in 2007 (and all other groups) fall generally in between other groups. However, we find that states that adopted the laws are not statistically different from those that did not adopt the law (we discuss the issue of potential endogeneity of the laws below).

For comparison, we also include plots of identity theft rates and their changes centered around the year of adoption (Figure 4). The left panel plots the identity theft rates and changes in identity theft rates (right panel) for three groups of states (those that adopted in 2005, 2006, and those that, as of 2009, had not adopted the data breach law). We include only these three groups for clarity and consistency with previous figures (only 2005 and 2006 provide three time periods before and adoption. Moreover, plots for states that adopted in 2007 to 2009 follow no observable pattern and therefore provide no additional insight). The $x$-axis represents the

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11 States that adopted in 2005 were Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, North Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington. States that adopted in 2006 were: Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin. States that adopted in 2007 were Arizona, Hawaii, Kansas, Michigan, New Hampshire, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming. States that adopted in 2008 were Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Oregon, Virginia, and West Virginia. States that adopted in 2009 were Alaska, Missouri, and South Carolina.

12 Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, New Mexico, and South Dakota.
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Table 1. Identity theft reports, 2002 to 2009.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>ID Theft Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>154,327</td>
<td>3,087</td>
<td>5,059</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>30,782</td>
<td>53.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>207,116</td>
<td>4,142</td>
<td>6,576</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>39,500</td>
<td>71.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>239,037</td>
<td>4,781</td>
<td>7,520</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>43,900</td>
<td>81.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>247,747</td>
<td>4,955</td>
<td>7,676</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>45,180</td>
<td>83.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>238,627</td>
<td>4,773</td>
<td>7,228</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>41,415</td>
<td>80.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>250,597</td>
<td>5,012</td>
<td>7,662</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>44,020</td>
<td>83.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>300,184</td>
<td>6,004</td>
<td>9,047</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>50,930</td>
<td>98.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>265,876</td>
<td>5,318</td>
<td>7,794</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>42,239</td>
<td>86.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Figure 3. Average Identity Theft Rates from 2002 to 2009.](image)

Three time periods before adoption of the law ($T - 3$, $T - 2$, and $T - 1$) and three time periods after adoption of the law ($T = 0$, $T + 1$, and $T + 2$). For example, for states that adopted in 2006, $T - 1$ represents data from 2005 and $T = 0$ represents data from 2006. Data for states without the law have been centered around 2006. $T$-tests of differences of means for each period (i.e., $T - 3$, . . . , $T + 3$) for each set of pairs of state groups (states adopting in 2005 vs. 2006, states adopting in 2005 vs. never adopting, states adopting in 2006 vs. never adopting) reveal no statistical difference. The left panel seems to suggest that identity theft rates increase before adoption of the laws for all groups. Rates for states that did not adopt show a decline in period $T + 2$, yet are still higher and show a gradual increase from $T = 0$. Moreover, although identity theft rates for states without the law are lower during some periods, rates for all groups increased over time, with states that adopted in early 2005 showing the largest increase before and after.

These trends provide some initial insight into what may (or may not) be driving the changes in identity theft reporting. We scrutinized the changes using a fixed effect regression model, as described in the following sections.

Exogeneity and Adoption of Data Breach Disclosure Laws

A practical concern with all empirical analyses that investigate the effect of a treatment (such as new data breaches legislation) on an outcome (in our case, identity
Figure 4. Identity Theft Rates and Percent Changes Before and After Law.
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Table 2. Delay (months) between filing, signature, and adoption.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>n</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Filing–Signature</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signature–Adoption</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filing–Adoption</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Do States with Higher Rates of Identity Theft Adopt More Quickly?

Next, we consider three important dates related to a legislative bill: the date it is first filed by a state legislator (representative from either the House, Assembly, or Senate), the date it is signed by the governor, and the date when it actually becomes effective. In Table 2, we show descriptive statistics regarding the time (in months) between filing and signature, signature and adoption, and the total time between filing and adoption of data breach disclosure laws.

First, notice the wide variation between filing and signature: less than a month for some states, almost two years for other states. Moreover, one state experienced only 2.5 months between filing and adoption, while another state took about 30 months. More specifically, Figure 5 illustrates the adoption durations for all states. The y-axis sorts states from highest to lowest identity theft rates (top to bottom). For example, Arizona, Nevada, and Texas had the highest rates of identity theft, while Iowa, Vermont, and North Dakota had the lowest.

To support the claim of endogeneity, we would expect that states with higher rates of identity theft would be quicker at both signing and adopting the bill (identified as diamonds and circles, respectively). That is, we would expect to see data points generally contained within the oval region shown in the figure: Data points for states with high rates (at the top of the y-axis) would be positioned very close to the y-axis, while data points for states with low rates of identity theft (near the bottom) would be very far from the y-axis (to the right). Clearly, however, the data are very scattered for states with both high and low rates of identity theft (supported by Table 2). Moreover, adoption of the bill does not appear to occur more quickly for states at the top relative to states at the bottom.

Furthermore, one might expect that states with higher rates of identity theft would be more likely to sign and adopt the bill. In order to examine this possibility, we performed Cox proportional hazard regressions (Jones & Branton, 2005), testing whether the average probabilities of a state filing or adopting the law were affected by that state’s rate of identity theft, as shown in Table 3.

We ran two alternative specifications of the regression, differing per the dependent variable: the period in which the bills were filed (hasFiledLaw) and the period in which the laws were actually adopted in the state legislature (hasLaw). The hazard ratio in both columns is very close to 1 (which indicates that the estimate is economically insignificant) and is also statistically insignificant. Thus, incidences of identity thefts within a state do not seem to drive adoption of the laws.

In sum, we find no systematic correlation between the rates of identity theft and the speed at which a law is passed, nor do we find statistical evidence of high identity theft.) is understanding the motivation behind the passage of the law. Specifically, we need to assess whether or not the adoption of state-level laws was itself driven by high levels of identity theft within each state. If the adoption of the law was endogenous to the rate of identity theft in a state, the unbiased impact of the law on identity theft would be harder to estimate. In this section, we first present theoretical and empirical evidence that suggest exogeneity, and then we discuss likely drivers of adoption of data breach laws.
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What Are the Drivers of Data Breach Laws?

We have just shown that state-specific rates of identity theft do not predict a state’s probability of enacting a breach disclosure law. This does not imply that identity theft and data breaches had no role in affecting the passage of the laws. In fact, we believe that the passage of data breach disclosure laws was affected mainly by the “diffusion of innovation” of policymaking among American states (Walker, 1969) and the rising attention paid nationwide to data breaches and identity thefts.
Walker (1969) noted that inertia and risk aversion are often obstacles to legislators writing new laws (the “innovation”); however, these issues quickly dissipate if the legislator can point to other states that have successfully adopted the law (the “diffusion”). He defined this as the diffusion of innovation of policymaking among American states. As more and more states adopt the law, Walker claims that

"[I]t may become recognized as a legitimate state responsibility, something which all states ought to have. When this happens it becomes extremely difficult for state decision makers to resist even the weakest kinds of demands . . . once a program has gained the stamp of legitimacy, it has a momentum of its own." (Walker, 1969, p. 890)

There is evidence that this process took place in the passage of data breach disclosure laws.

California was the first state to enact a disclosure law. The California law was co-introduced in California by representative Joe Simitian. The initial idea for the breach disclosure section of a consumer privacy bill, as Simitian describes it, came during the end of a conference call with industry advisors in which he asked if there was anything else to address. The idea for breach disclosure was proposed, discussed briefly, and then accepted. As he writes, “in a split second, the decision was made. An eleventh hour afterthought became part of the bill” (Simitian, 2009a, p. 1011). According to Simitian, the California data breach bill did eventually become law only because of “a spelling error, an afterthought, an unrelated concern with digital signatures, a page three news story, rule of germaneness, the intellectual quirks of a lame-duck Senator, the personal experiences of 120 state legislators, and another bill altogether” (Simitian, 2009a, p. 1009). When comparing the ideal legislative process to the reality of the data breach law enactment, Simitian confessed that, “in truth, [the legislative process] is far more random, dramatic, and idiosyncratic than any flow chart could ever describe” (2009a, p. 1009).

Because of the California bill (enacted in July 2003), the September 2004 breach of ChoicePoint (one of the largest U.S. data aggregators) became publicly known, causing a significant outcry and leading to calls for new federal legislation to protect personal information. Walker’s (1969) “diffusion” process had started. In the case of data breach disclosure laws, it arguably took two forms: (1) As more states started passing disclosure laws, passing the law became “recognized as a legitimate state responsibility” (Walker, p. 890); furthermore, (2) as more states began passing disclosure laws, more data breaches (which before would have otherwise gone undisclosed, and therefore unknown) became publicly disclosed, thereby fueling nationwide media discussion and attracting the attention of both citizens and policymakers, regardless of their state of residency.

Evidence exists for both dynamics. Throughout the 2000s, data breaches involving consumers across all states [such as the aforementioned ChoicePoint (Vijayan, 2008) and T.J.Maxx incidents (Kaplan, 2008)] were publicized in the national media. Likewise, an estimated tens of millions of identity theft victims (Javelin, 2010), the increasing number of reported data breaches (see Figure 2) tracked by a

13 As further justification for his motivations in writing and supporting the bill, Rep. Simitian stated that he wanted a bill that was well defined and very likely to succeed: “[W]hen you’re a new state legislator; high prospect of passage is very important” (Simitian, 2009b). Simitian further describes how, ironically, a couple of weeks after introducing this bill, there was a data breach in a California data center that contained records of state employees, some of whom were state legislators. Suddenly faced with a competing bill introduced by a very senior senator, Steve Peace, the two legislators each agreed to gut and amend their bill and create a new pair of identical bills, with each being each other’s cosponsor, in effect doubling their chances of approval. Indeed, the bills were both voted on, accepted, and presented to governor Schwarzenegger for signature. (Both bills were ultimately signed and became law.)
host of new organizations (such as datalossdb.org), as well as the increasing research by academic and legal scholars, certainly attracted the attention of legislators across the country, independently of the actual rates of identity theft in their specific state. For example, Michigan legislators explicitly referred to the nationwide problem that “identity theft is the fastest-growing crime in America today” when advocating the passage of state-level disclosure laws (Michigan Senate Journal, 2005, p. 31). And the above-mentioned ChoicePoint (a Georgia-based company) data breach raised such national concerns that Illinois Representative Fritchey, when discussing his own state’s data breach bill, declared that it “attempts to deal with what we’ve come to know as the choice point issue” (Illinois House Transcript, 2005). (That identity theft attracted the attention of legislators is clear from the fact that most of these laws specifically addressed identity theft prevention in their titles, introductions, or elsewhere in the bill.)

This increased awareness and attention paid nationwide to data breaches and identity theft was intertwined with the diffusion and imitation process described by Walker. For example, Michigan legislators argued, “[i]n comparison to other states’ efforts, we are beginning to fall woefully behind. I hope we can move on this legislation and preserve and protect consumer privacy and do what is best for the citizens of this great state” (Michigan Senate Journal, 2005, p. 31). Furthermore, Senator Jungbauer of the Minnesota Commerce Committee emphasized that “similar laws have been enacted in other states and [these data breach disclosure] bills are modeled on California enactments” (Minnesota Commerce Committee, 2006).

As a result, the pattern in which state lawmakers responded to rising concern over identity theft by enacting data breach laws is compatible with both Walker’s (1969) and Rogers’ (1962) accounts of an S-curve adoption pattern, as shown in Figure 6. California was the lone state with an enacted law in 2003 and 2004; in 2005, a few more states enacted similar laws; and then, between 2006 and 2007, consumer and corporate lobbying resulting from seemingly successful adoption in other states had created sufficient pressure to lead a vast majority of states to pass similar laws at nearly the same time.

It should be noted, finally, that the process through which innovative states (such as California) and imitator states enacted data breach disclosure laws nevertheless remains noisy. Specifically, the exact timing of filing and adoption is quite idiosyncratic and unpredictable—as exemplified by the considerable variance (as highlighted) across states in the delay between when the bills were filed, signed, and finally adopted (enacted). This further supports our conclusion that passage of the

**Figure 6. Total Adoption of Breach Laws over Time.**
laws was not endogenous to state-level rates of identity theft. All these examples, as well as our empirical tests, suggest that state-level rates of identity theft did not determine the time of filing nor adoption of a data breach disclosure law in a given state.

DATA ANALYSIS

Basic Model

We now specify an econometric model of the impact of the laws’ adoption on identity theft. To identify the effect of law, we exploit the panel nature of our data and employ state and time fixed effects. Our simplest model has the following form:

\[
\ln(\text{idTheft}_{st}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{hasLaw}_{st} + \theta_s + \lambda_t + \varepsilon_{st}
\]

\(\ln(\text{idTheft}_{st})\) is the log of reported identity thefts in each six-month period in state \(s\) at time \(t\) (we consider alternative outcome variable transformations like per capita identity theft later in this manuscript). \(\text{hasLaw}_{st}\) is a dummy variable, coded as 1 if the state has adopted the law and 0 otherwise. This dummy captures the effect of law on the identity theft rate. The dates of the adoption of data breach notification laws (between January 1, 2002, and December 31, 2009) were obtained from state legislature Web sites. For the purpose of analysis, we are interested in the date the law became effective rather than the date the law was passed. As described, we code adoption during each six-month time period for a number of reasons, because this is the smallest time frame by which we expect firms would be able to improve their security practices. Furthermore, by way of legislative procedures, state legislatures generally specify the effective date for laws to be either the beginning of the calendar year (January 1st), or the beginning of the fiscal year (July 1st).

\(\theta_s\) and \(\lambda_t\) are state and time fixed effects, and \(\varepsilon_{st}\) is the familiar error term. This state and time fixed effect model is widely used in the literature to examine the effect of a policy intervention (Bertrand, Duflo, & Mullainathan, 2004). State fixed effects allow us to control for unobserved state-specific factors and time dummies allow us to control for time trends. Thus, the unbiased effect of \(\text{hasLaw}\) can be identified from variation across state and time.

Basic Model with Demographic Controls and Related Privacy Laws

Additional factors, such as related privacy laws, or demographic factors that change over time and across states, may influence the relationship between the effect of the laws and identity theft. We consider this in Equation (2):

\[15\] This approach is also considered a difference-in-difference (DID) model. Some states undergo a treatment (law is passed) while others do not (law not passed), which provides a treatment and a control group. Our fixed effects model then estimates the difference in identity theft for the treatment group and the control group. Given that laws have been adopted at different times, this allows us to estimate a DID model.

\[16\] Indeed, for our sample, 30 of the 45 states adopted the laws either exactly on, or within one month after either of these dates. Seven more states had effective dates within two months of a new period, in which case we coded the law as having been adopted in that period. For the remaining eight states (those that adopted three or more months into the period), the law was coded starting the following period; for example, if adoption occurs more halfway through a six-month period, we set the adoption to occur in the next period. Thus, we estimate a more conservative effect of the law (that they have less time to be effective). We present results from the alternative specification (coding the adoption by these eight states as occurring in the current period) later in this manuscript.
ln(id theft, st) = β0 + β1 hasLaw, st + Σi ρi related, st + Σj δj economic, st + θs + λt + εst

Related, st represents credit-related laws that may also affect (prevent) identity thefts. One such is the credit freeze law. These laws enable consumers to apply access control to their credit reports, thereby preventing firms with which they have no prior agreement to make credit inquiries. If an attacker is trying to open a new account that requires a credit check, they will be stopped, and this kind of identity theft will be prevented.17 The Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA)18 is federal legislation that was passed as a response to identity theft. It allows individuals to request a free annual credit report. This legislation was enacted over the period from December 2004 to September 2005, beginning with West Coast states and ending with East Coast states. A variable was coded as 1 if the law existed in a given state and time and 0 otherwise.

Economic, st is a vector of state-level economic and demographic controls, as are commonly used in crime analysis (Lott & Mustard, 1997; Donohue, 2004; Wolters & Donohue, 2006), such as the log of population, per capita income, and the average unemployment rate over each six-month period (16 periods total). State population data were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau. Unemployment rates were collected from the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Personal income was gathered from the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department of Commerce. With the exception of population, which is only available annually, all data is available either monthly (identity theft, unemployment rate, adoption of related laws) or quarterly (income). In the case of population, we linearly extrapolated the missing data point as the average of the two adjacent years. For example, the first six-month period in 2008 was computed as the average of the second six-month period in 2007 and the first six-month period in 2008.

Extended Model

The basic model in Equation (1) and Equation (2) estimates the average effect of the laws. Next, we extend that model to examine how the laws may have differential effects.

Lagged Law

It is conceivable that the effect of the laws increases as firms invest in security measures over time. To test this, we introduce three lagged dummies, d1PerOld, d2PerOld, and d3PerOld, representing one (six months), two (one year), and three or more (1.5 years+) periods after the law is adopted, respectively.

Interstate Effect

The majority of breaches are, indeed, confined within a state, but any diffusion across states may nevertheless reduce the ability to identify an effect of law. We use two measures to control for this. First, we weight identity theft by interstate commerce activity in 2002 as a proxy for how connected a state is with other states. Ideally, we would include this as an explanatory variable in our econometric model; however, only cross-sectional (not panel) data were available. Second, we interact the hasLaw dummy variable with the percentage of all American states that have adopted the law by that time (hasLaw*PercStatesWLaw). The hasLaw dummy can

17 Note that it will not prevent victimization if the attacker uses an existing account.
now be interpreted as the effect of a law when no other states have adopted these laws. If the effect is national, then once a few states adopt the laws, the marginal impact of law may reduce considerably.

**Differential Effects**

Finally, we consider a number of specifications that reflect how the effect of the law on identity theft may differ across the states. The Bureau of Justice Statistics’ National Crime Victimization Survey on Identity Theft (Baum, 2007) reported greater levels of identity theft for households in more urban locations and with higher incomes. First, using data on percent urbanization for each state, we set an indicator variable equal to 1 if the state’s percent urbanization is greater than the mean of 68.8 percent (the results we present below do not change using the median urbanization). We then interacted urbanization with the state’s adoption of the law (\( \text{hasLaw} \times \text{Urban} \)). Second, we created an indicator variable for high income, setting it equal to 1 if the state’s income is greater than the median income from 2009 ($37,124). States coded as high income in this period remain high income in all time periods. We interacted this high-income dummy variable with the breach law (\( \text{hasLaw} \times \text{HighIncome} \)). Third, we relaxed the assumption that all breach disclosure laws are homogenous. Specifically, we considered that some laws may be stricter if they exhibit all of the following properties: are acquisition-based (forcing more disclosure from a lower threshold of breach); cover all entities (businesses, data brokers and government institutions); and allow for a private right of action (i.e., individual or class action law suits). Based on the examination of state laws, we classified nine states as having stricter laws: California, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, and Virginia. We then interacted strictness with the state’s adoption of the law (\( \text{hasLaw} \times \text{Strict} \)) to compare states with strict and non-strict laws.

**Mediating and Observable Variables in the Model**

Our conceptual framework identifies mediating variables (e.g., individuals who are notified and firm investments), but the empirical model focuses on observable variables that ultimately affect the outcome of interest: identity theft. This practice is not unfamiliar. For instance, researchers who study the effects of concealed gun laws recognize mediating effects, but relate the dependent and independent variable through observable control variables (Lott & Mustard, 1997; Black & Nagin, 1998; Cleary & Shapiro, 1999), and those who study capital punishment are often interested in the deterrent effect on murder rates (Dezhbakhsh & Shepherd, 2004). In both cases, the analysis of the treatment effects acknowledges the mediating but unobservable factors, but uses crime as the dependent variable and the effect of law and other economic and demographic controls as the independent variables. In addition, as previously discussed, there is a crucial relationship between data breach disclosure laws and identity theft that legislators have drawn, which provides the specific motivation for this analysis.

As discussed above, identity thefts occur for various reasons—only one of them being the result of data breaches. An important consideration for both our conceptual model and empirical estimation, therefore, is whether we are measuring the change in identity theft caused by all sources or change in identity theft caused by data breaches only. In the Appendix, we demonstrate that data aggregation may cause our standard errors to increase but will not lead to a biased estimate.

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20 All appendices are available at the end of this article as it appears in JPAM online. See the complete article at wileyonlinelibrary.com
RESULTS

Basic Model

Descriptive summary statistics for the main variables of our model are provided in Table 4. Table 5 presents the results of the regression in Equation (1) (the basic model with just time and state fixed effects) in column 1 and the results of Equation (2) (the basic model augmented with controls for demographics and related laws) in column 2. The dependent variable in all columns is the log of identity thefts (we provide robustness checks for alternative outcome variable transformations in the next section). All specifications use cluster-corrected standard errors by state and include 16 time dummies, although we do not report those estimates for improved readability.

The variable of interest is hasLaw, the effect of data breach disclosure laws. We hypothesized a negative coefficient, indicating that the data breach laws do, indeed, reduce identity thefts. The coefficient of hasLaw in column 1 suggests that adoption of the law reduces identity thefts by 5 percent and is significant at the 10 percent level. However, once we control for basic economic and related variables (column 2), the results suggest that the law reduces identity theft by 6.1 percent, which is significant at the 1 percent level.

Extended Model

The results of the extended model are reported in columns 3–5 of Table 5. Column 3 shows the effect of the lagged adoption of law and suggests that there is no significant change after six months, whereas 12 months after adoption identity theft decreases by 3.7 percent and is significant at the 1 percent level. However, once we control for basic economic and related variables (column 2), the results suggest that the law reduces identity theft by 6.1 percent, which is significant at the 1 percent level.

Table 4. Descriptive statistics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable (per 6-Month Period)</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Log(identity theft)</td>
<td>6.97</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>3.58</td>
<td>10.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity theft rate (per 100,000)</td>
<td>32.00</td>
<td>13.49</td>
<td>5.67</td>
<td>84.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity theft (total)</td>
<td>2,379.39</td>
<td>3,709.80</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>26,374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has data breach law</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has FACTA</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has credit freeze law</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d1PerOld (6 months old)</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d2PerOld (12 months old)</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d3PerOld (18 months old)</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita income</td>
<td>$35,547</td>
<td>$6,701</td>
<td>$23,019</td>
<td>$66,690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td>5.42</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>14.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log(population)</td>
<td>15.11</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>13.11</td>
<td>17.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper articles</td>
<td>21.48</td>
<td>26.32</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log(fraud)</td>
<td>7.88</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>5.21</td>
<td>11.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Column 5 tests the marginal effect of more urban states. The coefficient of interest is the interaction between urban and hasLaw. The results suggest that, indeed, the data breach laws reduce identity theft in more urban states by just over 10 percent relative to less urban states. The effect of the laws on non-urban states (the coefficient of hasLaw) was negative, though not significant. We did not find significant interactions, however, between the impact of the law and either its strictness or the indicator variable for higher-income states. Although this may suggest that stricter laws do not necessarily reduce identity thefts more than weaker ones, this should be considered with caution, as smaller sample size of these interactions makes such statistical inferences less reliable.

ROBUSTNESS

Alternative Outcome Variables

Table 6 presents regression results using alternative outcome variable transformations: per capita identity theft (identity theft per 100,000 population) in columns 1–2 and log of per capita identity theft in columns 3–4. First, note that the coefficients of hasLaw in columns 1 to 4 are negative. The estimate in column 2 is −1.411
Table 6. Robustness checks.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>haslaw</strong></td>
<td>-0.928 (0.818)</td>
<td>-1.411* (0.760)</td>
<td>-0.052* (0.027)</td>
<td>-0.061*** (0.023)</td>
<td>-0.061*** (0.023)</td>
<td>-0.061*** (0.022)</td>
<td>-0.008 (0.023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News articles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Has FACTA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.963** (0.767)</td>
<td>0.035* (0.019)</td>
<td>0.034* (0.019)</td>
<td>0.038** (0.019)</td>
<td>0.038** (0.019)</td>
<td>0.008 (0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has credit freeze law</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.212 (0.743)</td>
<td>0.036 (0.022)</td>
<td>0.035 (0.022)</td>
<td>0.036 (0.022)</td>
<td>0.036 (0.022)</td>
<td>-0.026 (0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income per capita</td>
<td>0.000 (0.000)</td>
<td>-0.000 (0.000)</td>
<td>-0.000 (0.000)</td>
<td>-0.000 (0.000)</td>
<td>-0.000 (0.000)</td>
<td>-0.000 (0.000)</td>
<td>-0.000 (0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td>0.106 (0.430)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.010)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.010)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.010)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.010)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.010)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log(population)</td>
<td>0.208 (12.728)</td>
<td>-1.268*** (3.433)</td>
<td>-1.282 (3.431)</td>
<td>-2.73 (3.431)</td>
<td>1.476*** (3.518)</td>
<td>1.476*** (3.518)</td>
<td>1.476*** (3.518)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State and time fixed effects</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>29.06*** (0.364)</td>
<td>20.2 (196.062)</td>
<td>3.28*** (0.015)</td>
<td>22.76*** (5.317)</td>
<td>11.46** (5.274)</td>
<td>11.331*** (5.326)</td>
<td>-13.40*** (5.373)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.752</td>
<td>0.756</td>
<td>0.822</td>
<td>0.833</td>
<td>0.851</td>
<td>0.851</td>
<td>0.970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of states</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.
and marginally significant at the 10 percent level. Using the overall average identity theft rate (per six-month period) of 32.8, the estimate suggests that, on average, adoption of data breach disclosure laws reduces the identity theft rate by about 4.3 percent (1.411/32.8), which is comparable to the 6.1 percent obtained in the main result. Column 4 (log of per capita identity theft) supports the estimate of the log-level specification in Table 5, a reduction of 6.1 percent, significant at the 1 percent level. Note that our main specification, log(identity theft), achieved the best fit for the data (i.e., an $R^2$ of 0.85).

**Graphical Robustness Methods**

As mentioned, empirical analyses of the effect of laws on crime can be fraught with debate over model specification and sensitivity across observational units (states) or time (as with the debate over concealed gun laws and capital punishment). In order to partially address these concerns, we perform a detailed robustness analysis as described by Dugan (2002) and shown in Figure 7.

The $y$-axis represents the $t$-statistics from regressing identity theft on the full set of covariates and state and time fixed effects, Equation (2). The left panel refers to per capita identity theft (per 100,000 population), while the right panel refers to log(identity theft). Each box plot represents the distribution of $t$-statistics as we omit one of each of the 50 states at a time (50 observations per boxplot). Then we do this 6 times, first omitting data from 2005, then 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009. The “X” represents the inclusion of a year’s data, while the “0” represents the exclusion of that year. For example the left boxplot (in both panels) represents the distribution of $t$-statistics when we omit data from 2005 (0XXXX). The rightmost boxplot (in both panels) includes data from all years (XXXXX). The plots are presented on the same $y$-axis scale for easier comparison.

First, we notice that the $t$-statistics for per capita identity theft (left panel) are generally smaller compared with log(identity theft), though the outliers are more pronounced in the left panel. The outliers for most boxplots (in both panels) are those states that have never adopted the law (Alabama, New Mexico, Mississippi, and South Dakota). Interestingly, the upper outliers (those that reduce the $t$-statistics) are generally Alabama, New Mexico, and Mississippi, while the lower outlier is generally South Dakota.

Generally, this method is most useful for testing whether our average coefficient results are driven by particular states or years. For example, if the boxplots for all years except 2009 were tight around −1.0, but the boxplot for 2009 was much lower (say, −5.0), then this would be cause for concern. However, we see no such extremes in either panel. Overall, this analysis provides further evidence that our results are robust to state and year outliers.

**Awareness Bias**

A further consideration of disclosure laws is that they may produce a conflicting (opposing) effect by increasing consumer awareness—what we call an *awareness bias*. Because identity theft rates are based on self-reported information, the passage of a law may increase consumer awareness, causing more people to report incidents. This, in turn, would dampen our estimates. First, as more consumers are notified of breaches, the number of consumers who will check their credit reports and discover instances of identity theft may increase. Second, when more state-level disclosure laws are passed, this fuels an increase in media attention from data breaches and the threat of identity theft. This scenario may lead more victims from all forms of identity theft (not just from data breaches) to report the crime. We address this awareness bias in two ways.
Figure 7. *T*-Statistics for per Capita and Log Identity Theft Regressions.
First, and to the extent that awareness bias exists, we believe it would bias our regression estimates to produce a lower bound on the effect of law. Therefore, we expect that the true effect of law is at least as strong in sign and magnitude as found in our analysis. Recall, however, that all regression models revealed a negative coefficient, with most revealing statistically significant results.

Second, we attempted to estimate the effect that the passage of a disclosure law in a given state may have had on consumer awareness of their identity theft. Because one of the effects of the laws was to force firms to disclose their breaches, more media reports appeared following a state law enactment, publicizing breaches (and the related risk of identity theft). This increased media coverage would have captured the attention of consumers and may have increased their likelihood of checking their credit reports in order to establish whether they had been victim of identity theft. To control for this, we used the Google archive to count the presence of phrases “identity theft” and “data breach” in newspaper articles across all states from 2002 to 2009. For each state, we collected data from two newspapers that included either the capital or a major metropolitan area (or both). We then counted the hits for either, and both, search phrases for each six-month period from 2002 to 2009, creating a panel data set. Descriptive statistics for these news reports are also included in Table 4. The news reports steadily increase from 2002 (total count of 1,245) until 2006 (maximum of 3,186), after which they decline slightly until 2009 (to 2,034). We then used the state-level counts of either or both phrases as additional controls in a new set of regressions. We find that even when controlling for this awareness bias, our results hold, as shown—for one exemplary specification—in column 5 of Table 6.

**Alternative Coding of Law Adoption**

We previously described how 30 of 45 states adopted the laws either exactly on or within one month of January 1 or July 1 and that for eight states (those that adopted three or more months into the period), the law was coded starting the following period. For instance, if adoption occurred more than halfway through a six-month period, we set the adoption to occur in the next period. Critical readers might wonder whether the coding for these eight states may drive our estimates. Therefore, as a further robustness test, we coded these eight observations with the law being adopted in the current period. As shown in column 6 of Table 6, the coefficient of \( \text{hasLaw} \) is now 0.065 and still highly significant, suggesting that our main result represents a fairly conservative estimate.

**Falsification Check**

Another category of crimes catalogued by the FTC is “fraud,” which is collected, managed, and reported in a virtually identical method as for identity theft. It includes such crimes as fraudulent shop-at-home and catalog sales, prizes and sweepstakes, fraudulent Internet auctions, and foreign money offers. Considering these types of crimes and given the similarity to identity theft in the way they are tracked, we believe that frauds can provide a simple falsification test: We expect the data breach laws to affect identity theft but not fraud. Therefore, a regression of the law on fraud (using the same explanatory variables as with Equation 2) should reveal no significant effect. Indeed, as shown in column 7 of Table 6, such regressions produce no statistically significant results.

**Sampling Bias**

Another potential issue with the FTC data is sampling bias—the possibility that those reporting the crimes are somehow systematically different from the total population.
suffering from them. We observe only a small amount of demographic information regarding the consumer identity theft reports, but we can, at least, compare age distribution of those who reported complaints to the FTC (FTC, 2007a) with age distributions from victim survey data (Baum, 2006, 2007) and the FTC (2007b). In both cases, results reveal that the 18- to 29-year-old cohort consistently reports more identity thefts relative to those aged 60 or older, which provides some evidence that those reporting the crimes are similar to the best estimate of the total population of identity theft victims.

DISCUSSION

Our research analyzes the impact of data breach disclosure laws on identity theft. We use a standard econometric approach commonly used in literature and have controlled for various limitations in the data. We find that adoption of these laws reduces identity theft due to breaches by a statistically significant amount of 6.1 percent, on average, and are robust to multiple specifications, including transformations of the outcome variable and exclusion of individual states and years. To place the results in context, recall that the average amount stolen from consumers in 2005 was $6,383 (Javelin, 2006) and the mean number of identity theft reports over 2002 to 2009 was 238,791. Given a mean reduction of 6.1 percent (and 95 percent CI of 10.66 and 1.54), this provides a mean reduction in the cost of identity theft by $93 million (0.061*$6,383*238,791, with a 95 percent confidence interval between $162 million and $23 million).

We do not find any significant relationship regarding the strictness of these laws on identity theft, nor do we find any significant effect of the laws in regions of higher population. Although we do not find evidence of the laws gaining strength with time, we do find some evidence that the laws were effective in a short-term (6 to 12 month) period, which could be explained by a temporary heightened awareness by consumers of the notifications, causing them to briefly take more precautions. Perhaps, then, as more notices are sent, and without noticeable signals of the effect of their actions, consumers would become desensitized and ignore further notices.

It is also conceivable that limitations in the FTC data may restrict our inferences about the true effect of law. However, reported crime data is commonly used as a proxy for actual crimes in empirical studies. Moreover, effects such as awareness bias common to all states (say, from a nationally syndicated news program or nationally circulated online or printed magazine) would be captured in our regression by time fixed effects. Similarly, unobserved state variables such as race or income that could potentially influence identity theft rates would be captured by state fixed effects.

The lack of otherwise economically stronger findings may be due to a number of factors. One explanation is that the laws are simply not particularly effective at reducing the number of identity theft victims because of lack of consumer or firm action.

Consumer inaction may be a result of behavioral decision biases such as optimism bias (consumers perceiving their chances of suffering identity theft to be very low), rational ignorance (consumers believing the cost of taking precautions outweighs any benefits they may receive), and status quo bias (consumers’ own inertia inhibiting them from anticipating the consequences of identity theft and responding) (Loewenstein, John, & Volpp, in press). Magat and Viscusi (1992) argue that disclosure legislation will only be effective if the human element is considered. They claim that consumers are not always rational decision makers and that notices “must convey information in a form that can be easily processed, and in an accurate and meaningful way that will enable individuals to make informed decisions” (p. 17). For example, there is evidence that very few disclosure letters inform consumers of
the data that was actually compromised or provide customer support contact information (Samuelson Law Clinic, 2007). In addition, less than 10 percent of the 163,000 consumers availed themselves of free credit monitoring services following the ChoicePoint breach (Brodkin, 2007), and another study found that 44 percent of identity theft victims ignored breach notification letters (FTC, 2007b). A recent Ponemon survey discovered that 77 percent of respondents claimed to be concerned or very concerned about loss or theft of personal information, but only 47 percent of respondents took advantage of free or subsidized credit monitoring services (Ponemon Institute, 2008).

On the other hand, managers of firms may also believe that the firm's probability of suffering a breach is small enough that they may still not fully appreciate (and therefore internalize) the associated penalties. Or they may estimate the net direct and indirect costs of breaches to be quite small, compared with the investments necessary to significantly decrease the probability of those breaches. For example, ChoicePoint incurred a total of $26 million in fines and fees (Vijayan, 2008), and they survived, with their assets (consumer personal information) being valuable enough to become a recent acquisition target by Reed Elsevier (the parent company of LexisNexis; see Nakashima & O'Harrow, 2008). In addition, T.J.Maxx reported costs of $178 million for a breach that was disclosed in early 2007 and involved over 47 million customer records. Despite this, they enjoyed a quarterly increase in profits by 47 percent one year later (Kaplan, 2008).

Clearly, it appears that the effectiveness of data breach disclosure laws relies on actions taken by both firms and consumers. Firms can improve their data protection; however, once notified, the responsibility turns to consumers to reduce their risk of identity theft—something that only a minority appears to be doing. It may be that only with time will more firms internalize the costs of breaches (and ensuing identity theft), more consumers respond to the risks, and the victimization rates decline even further.

Furthermore, if the vast majority of identity theft does not originate from data breaches (either because the information is simply lost and will never be used maliciously or credit card companies reimburse consumers for their loss), then the maximum effectiveness of these laws may inherently be limited.

CONCLUSION

As information security and privacy concerns rise, we will increasingly see legislation used as a tool for consumer protection, generating policy debates and significant lobbying. In this paper, we investigated the effects on identity theft rates of increasingly popular, though contentious, data breach disclosure laws. Despite many U.S. states having adopted these laws since 2003, we have seen no empirical work that examines their efficacy. Using panel data from 2002 to 2009, we conducted an empirical analysis to examine whether these laws have reduced identity theft and found that the passage of law reduced identity thefts by about 6.1 percent.

Proper research on the effectiveness of data breach disclosure laws is hampered by the relative scarcity of data. Hoofnagle (2007) argues that the current collection of identity theft records is not sufficient and that banks and other organizations should be required to release identity theft data to the public for proper research. We certainly agree with this view. To the extent that sampling and awareness biases can be reduced, this will allow researchers to more accurately measure the impact of disclosure laws. Moreover, we believe that the better collection of identity theft victimization, consumer and firm losses, and changes in firm behavior will be valuable for researchers, policymakers, and consumers.

A broader issue relevant to policymakers is whether there are other means by which these laws could (and should) be evaluated. Environmental disclosure laws often measure a deterrent policy by their effectiveness at reducing not just the frequency of
incidents, but also the severity of incidents (Cohen, 2000). Therefore, it is possible that these disclosure laws could help reduce the severity of the crimes (as measured by the amount of consumer loss or type of identity theft) or reduce the number of records lost or stolen per breach. Indeed, studies have shown that victims lose less money the sooner they become aware of fraudulent activity (FTC, 2007b; Javelin Research, 2006). Javelin claims that losses are 21 percent lower when consumers detect identity theft within the first week and 65 percent lower when consumers detect the crime within a year. Our own analysis (using available breach data from 2002 to 2007) suggests that adoption of these laws reduced the number of consumer records lost per breach by about 800 on average—a change of 34 percent.

In addition to considering alternative measures of consumer benefits, we believe it is also important to measure the costs imposed on firms due to these laws. Indeed, if it is true that the laws impose a substantial cost, then policymakers will likely be interested in quantifying these amounts when considering further (federal) legislation. As discussed, firm costs will include such costs as notifying affected consumers, legal fees, and customer care operations. Analytical research has shown that when these additional firm costs (the “disclosure tax”) are lower than the benefits from the reduction in consumer identity theft, social costs will decline. However, even when the disclosure tax is greater, overall social costs can still be lower (Romanosky, Sharp, & Acquisti, 2010).

Moreover, information disclosure is simply one among many alternative interventions that a policymaker could employ when reducing the externalities caused by firms. For example, ex ante safety regulation and ex post liability are also commonly examined (Shavell, 1984; Kolstad, Ulen, & Johnson, 1990). Ex ante safety regulation mandates a minimum level of care with best practices or safety codes and is meant to prevent harms from ever occurring, especially catastrophic harms. For example, fire safety specifications or operating licenses (for cars, or medical and legal practitioners). In regard to data security, ex ante safety regulation has been most predominant regarding the protection of payment (credit, debit) cards. The PCI DSS (Payment Card Industry, Data Security Standard) is a self-regulated initiative operated by the credit card merchants (VISA, Mastercard) that requires all vendors that process, store, or transmit payment card information to comply with specific data security controls. The Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX) and Gramm–Leach–Bliley Acts (GLBA) are other examples of mandated standards.

Ex post liability, on the other hand, is employed only after the harm has occurred and allows victims to recover losses from the injurer (the firm that suffered the breach) through lawsuits. To date, however, plaintiffs have been largely unsuccessful at winning civil actions, with most being dismissed because victims have been unable to convince judges that they have suffered actual harm.

Nevertheless, the legal doctrine resulting from (alleged) privacy violations is evolving, as is the balance of policy interventions. Therefore, the question may not be which alternative is most effective, but how can ex ante regulation, ex post liability, and information disclosure be used together most efficiently to reduce social costs.

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